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BECKET AT THE BAR-THE CONFLICTING




Eight centuries ago Henry II, anxious to extend his influence over
an all too independent church, arranged the selection of Thomas A
Becket, the King's Chancellor and longtime aide and comrade, as Arch-
bishop of Canterbury. Once installed at the see of Canterbury, however,
Becket repeatedly found himself compelled to place his responsibilities as
the head of the church ahead of his loyalty to and friendship for Henry,
with ultimately tragic consequences for all, most especially the Arch-
bishop himself. Today the Solicitor General seems increasingly a Becket-
like figure, forced to make an unhappy choice between representing the
policies of the President, or at least of the President's more activist staff
and supporters, and meeting his obligations to the Supreme Court.' The
first sign of trouble surfaced in January, 1982, in a footnote to the gov-
ernment's brief in Bob Jones University v. United States,2 which warned
the Supreme Court that the then Acting Solicitor General did not agree
with the administration's new position that the IRS was legally required
to grant tax exempt status to racially segregated private schools.3 The
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; Lecturer in
Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1962, M.A. 1963, Johns Hopkins University; B. Phil. 1965,
Oxford University; LL.B. 1968, Yale University. The author has handled more than 50 cases
in the Supreme Court, in some instances allied with, and in others opposed by, the Solicitor
General.
1. Former Solicitor General Rex Lee commented in 1987: "'I have frankly concluded
that it is virtually impossible in today's world to occupy a position like solicitor general with-
out, on the one hand, incurring the disfavor of some groups with very strong ideological views
or, on the other, impairing your credibility with the Court.'" Freiwald, Right Turns Against
Fried, Legal Times, May 18, 1987, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Legal Times].
2. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
3. Brief for the United States at 1, Goldboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 454
U.S. 892 (1981) (No. 81-1) and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No. 81-
3):
This brief sets forth the position of the United States on both questions presented.
The Acting Solicitor General fully subscribes to the position set forth on question
number two, only. His views on question one are set forth in the Brief for the United
States fied in this Court in September 1981, in response to the petitions for certiorari
in these cases. Those views are more fully developed in a draft brief on the merits
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Bob Jones brief itself provoked outrage from supporters of civil rights
and prompted the Court to take the unusual step of appointing an amicus
curiae to present the position that had been abandoned by the govern-
ment. Six months later the denunciations came from a very different
quarter, the National Right to Work Committee demanding the dismis-
sal of Solicitor General Rex Lee for conduct allegedly "in direct conflict
with the Reagan Administration policy."4 Less than four weeks after
that attack the New York Times castigated Lee for filing a brief which it
described as merely a "political tract.., suited to the partisan purposes
of an Administration eager to appease its disgruntled right wing" and for
"trashing the [Justice] department's reputation as a source of principled
counsel to the Court."' A series of news reports regarding subsequent
controversies6 culminated in a March, 1987 hearing by a subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee,7 a provocative series of articles in the
August, 1987 issues of The New Yorker,8 and the publication of The
Tenth Justice9 by Lincoln Caplan, the author of The New Yorker series. 0
which was ready to be printed for timely filing in early January 1982. Copies of that
draft brief were furnished by the Department of Justice in late January 1982, pursu-
ant to request, to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means
Committee, along with other documents requested by those committees.
Question one concerned whether the Internal Revenue Code authorized the IRS to deny tax
exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The second question presented con-
cerned the constitutionality of the IRS regulations denying tax exemptions to such schools.
4. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1982, at A12, col. 2.
5. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1982, at A22, col. 1.
6. See, e.g., Wash. Post, July 7, 1986, at A7, col. 1 ("A series of High Court Rebuffs for
Reagan: Solicitor General's Decision to Push Ideological Claims Has Proved Costly, Critic
Says"); id., Mar. 18, 1986, at A17, col. 1 ("Legal Office Shaken by Staff Departures: Solicitor
General Defends New Activism"); id., Jan. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 1 ("Solicitor General Takes On
Critics"); id., May 1, 1985, at A4, col. 1 ("U.S. Solicitor General Lee Resigning Amid Contro-
versy"); Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1 ("Reagan Conservatives Assail Solicitor
General For His Independence"); N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1982, at B4, col. 1 (Lee Criticized by
Justices Blackmum and Stevens during oral argument); id., July 30, 1982, at D16, col. 3 (brief
on abortion filed by Solicitor General Lee).
7. Testimony of Professor Burt Neuborne, New York University Law School, Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Judiciary Committee, March 19, 1987 (unpublished)
(copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Office) [hereinafter Neuborne Testimony].
8. Caplan, Annals of Law: The Tenth Justice-I, NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 29;
Caplan, Annals of Law: The Tenth Justice-I, NEW YORKER, Aug. 17, 1987, at 30.
9. L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW (1987).
10. For previous commentaries on the office of the Solicitor General, see Memorandum
Opinion for the Attorney General: Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228
(1977) [hereinafter 1977 Memorandum]; F. BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY (1962); Cox, The
Government in the Supreme Court, 44 CHI. B. REc. 221 (1963); Fahy, The Office of the Solici-
tor General, 28 A.B.A. J. 20 (1942); Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Represent-
ing the Interests of the United States Before Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REV. 528 (1969);
Perlman, The Work of the Office of the Solicitor General of the United States, 54 MD. ST. B.
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Some of the more specific disputes have been rendered moot by sub-
sequent events. Solicitor General Lee, ultimately more unpopular with
the right than with the left, resigned in the spring of 1985. His successor,
Charles Fried, was during his first year in office even more controversial
than Lee, but Caplan reports at least a change in tone in the Solicitor
General's office during the 1986-87 Term of the Supreme Court.11 In the
spring of 1987, Fried distanced himself from the more strident wing of
the Justice Department, strongly disavowing a casual suggestion by a De-
partment colleague that the Reagan Administration's racial policies
would be furthered by the departure from the Court, or from this life, of
a few sitting Justices. 2 More recently Fried has had the good fortune to
be criticized by conservatives as well as by liberals, surely a sign that he is
doing something right. 3 But the controversies of the last several years
have brought to light major unresolved questions about the proper role of
the Solicitor General, the answers to which will be of ongoing impor-
tance to the Justice Department and the Court long after Solicitor Gen-
eral Fried has forsaken his comparatively quiet and congenial public life
for the far more politicized and disputatious world of Harvard Law
School.
Although the position of Solicitor General has existed for 118
years,14 relatively little attention has been paid to the manner in which
the Solicitor General and his or her assistants ought to do their work. In
the past it had been generally assumed that the only threat to the proper
functioning of the Solicitor General's office was an external one, that seri-
ous problems would be avoided so long as the Solicitor General was not
subject, at least save in extraordinary circumstances, to supervision or
ASS'N 265 (1949); Sobeloff, Attorney for the Government. The Work of the Solicitor General's
Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229 (1955) [hereinafter Sobeloff I]; Sobeloff, The Law Business of the
United States, 34 OR. L. REv. 145 (1955) [hereinafter Sobeloff II]; Stem, The Solicitor Gen-
eral's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46 A.B.A. J. 154 (1960) [hereinafter Stern
I]; Stem, "Inconsistency" In Government Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REv. 759 (1951) [hereinafter
Stem II]; Uelman, The Influence of the Solicitor General Upon Supreme Court Disposition of
Federal Circuit Court Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth Circuit Record, 69 JuDICATURE
361 (1986); Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A Quarter Cen-
tury of Advocacy, 36 GEo. WASH. L. RPv. 481 (1968); Solicitor General. Has Office Been
Politicized?, 72 A.B.A. J. 20 (1986) [hereinafter Office Politicized]; Comment, Government Liti-
gation in the Supreme Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALE L.J. 1442 (1969).
11. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 274-75.
12. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
13. Legal Times, supra note I (noting attacks on Fried in Judicial Notice and Human
Events); 47 Human Events, May 23, 1987, at 428, 429.
14. The best history of the origin of the Solicitor General's office is in Lee, Lawyering in
the Supreme Court: The Role of the Solicitor General, Sup. Or. HisT. Soc'y Y.B. 15, 16
(1985).
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control by others in the government, particularly by his or her nominal
superiors, the Attorney General and the President. Francis Biddle, who
served as Solicitor General in 1940-41, argued that that independence
was central to the nature of the Solicitor General's office:
[The Solicitor General] determines what cases to appeal, and
the client has no say in the matter, he does what his lawyer tells
him, the lawyer stands in his client's shoes, for the client is but
an abstraction. He is responsible neither to the man who ap-
pointed him nor to his immediate superior in the hierarchy of
the administration. The total responsibility is his[.] ... The
Solicitor General has no master to serve except his country.15
In 1977, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLO), asked to provide gui-
dance as to the manner in which the Solicitor General should formulate
and present the government's positions before the Supreme Court, em-
phasized that same independence both from the Attorney General and
"within the executive branch as a whole."16 The most important reason
for that status, OLC argued, was "the prevalent belief that such indepen-
dence is necessary to prevent narrow or improper considerations (polit-
ical or otherwise) from intruding upon the presentation of the
Government's case in the Nation's highest Court." 1 7 Cases in which the
Solicitor General's office might properly consider the views of the Attor-
ney General or President were so rare, OLC maintained, and the danger
that the process would be distorted by an expression of their views was so
great, that neither official should express any position on a case unless
asked to do so by the Solicitor General. "If the independent legal advice
of the Solicitor General is to be preserved, it should normally be the
Solicitor General who decides when to seek the advice of the Attorney
General or the President in a given case.""8 In their dealings with the
Solicitor General, the Attorney General and the President were not to
speak unless spoken to. Neither Becket nor any other Archbishop of
Canterbury ever enjoyed such stature in his dealings with the English
monarchy.
Measured by this standard of independence from supervisory con-
trol, the tenure of the current Solicitor General, Charles Fried, should
have been a halcyon era in the history of that office. There appear to
have been repeated efforts to persuade the Attorney General to overrule
Fried's predecessor, Rex Lee, and it has been suggested that the Attorney
15. F. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 97.
16. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 228, 230.
17. Id. at 231.
18. Id. at 235.
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General should have given Lee greater backing in these disputes than
actually occurred.19 But there seem to be no claims that the Attorney
General or President have intervened in Fried's decision making, or even
given unsolicited advice. Professor Neuborne "accept[s] at face value
[Fried's] assertions that his [positions] ... reflect his own views about
what the law should be."
20
The controversy surrounding Fried's tenure as Solicitor General has
concerned, not interference with his decisions by the Attorney General
or the President, but the positions which the Solicitor General's office
itself has taken in a variety of cases. That controversy involves not only
some essentially factual disputes about what the Solicitor General's office
has done, and how the Court has reacted, but also several fundamental
disagreements about what the Solicitor General ought to be doing. Cen-
tral to this dispute has been a disagreement about whether the Solicitor
General's primary rsponsibility is to the administration in which he or
she serves or to the Supreme Court. Bruce Fein, a former Reagan Justice
Department official, whose views on such matters may be fairly de-
scribed, in the tradition of the Soviet Union's Victor Posner, as semi-
official, remarked in 1984, while stationed at the FCC, "My conception
19. Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1, contained the following account of efforts by
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds to overcome Lee's opposition to filing
a Justice Department amicus brief in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985):
[I]t was clear that Mr. Reynolds had the support of the White House. "There was a
real back channel to the White House," says one participant in the debate who sided
with Mr. Lee. "More than once, our positions were shot down at the White House
by people who shouldn't even have known what we were doing." Mr. Fein confirms
that Mr. Meese [then White House counselor] was kept informed of developments
and supported Mr. Reynolds....
Attorney General Smith again intervened. "What am I going to tell the White
House?" he asked Mr. Lee when the solicitor general expressed reservations....
A spokesman for the attorney general, acknowledging the controversy, says the
"attorney general doesn't shrink from differences of opinion among his staff, on the
contrary, he encourages them."
The evident meaning of the Attorney General's spokesman was that he encouraged other
members of "his staff" to disagree with the Solicitor General, presumably intending to resolve
any such disagreements himself. Caplan reports that "running to the AG" was a common
practice by Reynolds when he was dissatisfied with Lee's position. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9,
at 88. Lee's controversial brief in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983), was reportedly cleared by White House aides Meese and Baker. N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1982, at D16, col. 3.
20. Newborne Testimony, supra note 7, at 8-9; see also, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1987, at A21,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 18, 1986, at A6, col. 1; Assistant Attorney General Reynolds com-
mented in 1987, "I place myself in the camp of a colleague who works with [Fried] and dis-
agrees with him at times, but he makes the calls on the Supreme Court." Legal Times, supra
note 1. Mr. Reynolds' attitude towards Solicitor General Lee was evidently less deferential.
See supra note 19.
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of the office of [S]olicitor [G]eneral... is that it should be a foremost
promoter of the policies of the president before the court."'" Former
Chief Justice Burger, responding to published criticism of Fried, insisted:
"It has always been my view that the [S]olicitor [G]eneral is the govern-
ment's advocate in the Supreme Court, not the Supreme Court's repre-
sentative in the executive branch."22 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist
is apparently skeptical about the view that the Solicitor General owes
special deference to the Court,23 an anonymous Justice in commenting
on the Justice Department, not on Chief Justice Rehnquist, reportedly
commented "[t]he notion that the SG has no obligation to help the Court
is an outrage."'24 Professor Neuborne squarely rejects Fein's position,
insisting that the Solicitor General traditionally has not been, and ought
not become, a "mouthpiece" for the President or "an ideological cheer-
leader for the administration."
I believe that the Solicitor General's office-like the great insti-
tution it serves, the Supreme Court, should function at a level
of principle that minimizes, even if it cannot eliminate, the in-
fluence of politics and partisan ideology on the growth of law. I
believe that the principal task of the Solicitor General's office is
to provide the Executive branch and the Supreme Court with
technically excellent advice about the meaning and logical ap-
plication of existing law. I do not believe that the talent and
prestige of the Solicitor General's office should be expended in
sustained ideological attempts to push the law in a particular
direction. 25
Solicitor General Cox has advanced an intermediate view, urging "the
Solicitor General has conflicting obligations-to his client and to the
21. Wall St. I., Sept. 6, 1984, § 1, at 1, col 1. See also McClellan, A Lawyer Looks at Rex
Lee, 1 BENCHMARK: A BIMONTHLY REP. ON THE CONST. & THE CI's., 1, 2 (1984) ("As a
spokesman and strategist for the Reagan Administration ... Lee's performance has been less
satisfactory."); McLaughlin, From Washington Straight: SocialAgenda Stymied, NAT'L REV.,
May 27, 1983, at 611 (criticizing Lee for failing to meet his "responsibility for engineering...
changes' . . in the constitutional and statutory jurisprudence handed down by the Warren and,
alas, Burger Courts," changes that are "[tihe chief struts of President Reagan's social agenda";
detailed analysis of Lee's briefs under the heading "Whose SG?"); supra note I ("'You either
serve your master, the attorney general, or you resign, charges Daniel Popeo, general counsel
of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation' ").
22. Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1987, at A21, col. 1.
23. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 265.
24. Id. at 267 (quoting confidential interview).
25. Newborne Testimony, supra note 7, at 2-3. Neuborne regards the Solicitor General as
having obligations as well to the administration, but insists that those obligations are subsidi-
ary to the Solicitor General's responsibilities to the Court.
1192
BECKET AT THE BAR
Court-and, I think, has about as much duty to one as to the other."26
Critics of Solicitor General Fried have asserted that he has
"politicized" the Solicitor General's office, a charge which Fried ear-
nestly denies.27 This dispute may reflect not so much a disagreement
about what has occurred during Fried's tenure as a difference of opinion
regarding what constitutes improper politicization. Some of Fried's crit-
ics have argued that Fried failed to frame government briefs to conform
to the present views of a majority of the Court; Fried insists that doing so
would itself be improper politicization: "'I think there's something con-
descending about only saying things which, on some kind of nose-count-
ing prognostication, the court is going to adopt.... I think it is less
political, not more political.., to speak to the logic of the case as we see
it.' "28 When Fried asserts that his office is untainted by politics, he is
evidently referring to partisan politics; Fried regards his personal philo-
sophy as an entirely legitimate factor in the framing of government
briefs.
I do not believe that our office has been politicized, and I would
not wish to serve as Solicitor General in order to further a pro-
cess of politicization. I suppose that the President has nomi-
nated me because he has some sense of what my philosophy is,
and that philosophy enters my judgment of what the law is on a
particular matter, and what arguments should be made. But
certainly partisan political considerations have never entered
into our judgments, never should enter into our judgments, and
I would never allow them to enter into our judgments.29
26. Cox, iupra note 10, at 222; see also Griswold, supra note 10, at 535 (noting "the pecu-
liar ambivalence of the function we must fill as lawyers. We are lawyers, representing a client;
we are also, in a special sense, officers of the Court. The Solicitor General has a special obliga-
tion to aid the Court as well as to serve his client.").
27. Office Politicized, supra note 10; Wash. Post, March 18, 1986, at A17, col. 1; Wash.
Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 1.
28. Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 1 (emphasis in original).
29. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 151. In a separate interview, Fried suggested that he was
guided by his personal views on some, but not all, issues:
A: ... [I]f the Antitrust Division believes that certain kinds of positions ought to be
pursued as a matter of antitrust policy, then I carry that forward. What is more
interesting and perhaps a bit more distinctive is that this is an administration which
has a specific view not just about particular legal subjects, but about how the law
itself should be developing. It has a view about the role of courts, about the proper
forms of statutory interpretation, which is rather careful, tending towards the literal.
We have a view about things like the use of legislative history.
Q: You just said 'we?'
A: I do indeed say that because I was attracted from being a teacher to come to work
here because I had certain views about the development of law. I thought in fact that
we had gotten into sort of a bad way in a number of areas and as a professor I had
written in this area and had the sense that the administration had many of the same
June 1988] 1193
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In 1973, on the other hand, Robert Bork advised the Senate that he
would disregard his own philosophical views while serving as Solicitor
General.
Senator Tunney.... The one thing that I must say from
these hearings is that I have gained the impression that you are
prepared to put aside your own personal philosophy and to ar-
gue cases on appeal and to bring cases up for appeal on the
basis of the policy as enunciated by the agencies and the Attor-
ney General and on the basis of the law as it presently stands.
Mr. Bork. That is correct, Senator.3
Bork indicated he would press the Supreme Court to overrule a prece-
dent only "if there was reason to believe that the Supreme Court wished
to reconsider the subject. I do not think I ought to take appeals up just
because I would like to reconsider the subject. ' 31 But conservatives have
criticized Solicitor General Rex Lee for taking the cautious approach
urged by Bork, arguing that precedents should be challenged whenever
the President's policies called for reconsideration of a reigning precedent.
One such commentator objected: "During his.., tenure in office, Solici-
tor General Rex Lee has not urged the Supreme Court to overrule a
single prior decision .... ,31 The same conservative also noted that:
"Instead of confronting the Justices with principled arguments, challeng-
ing them to defend the rationale of their opinions, and demanding rever-
sal of liberal precedents, Lee has consistently addressed the Court as a
dutiful and fawning serf might approach the Czar."' 33 Within the last
year Solicitor General Fried reportedly declined to authorize an attack
on Miranda v. Arizona,34 despite the Attorney General's long public disa-
greement with that decision, a refusal which apparently triggered con-
dispositions that I do. I have not had to bother very much checking to see whether
people agree with my views because I have this sense that I'm Solicitor General
because of the views that I have rather than the other way around. So on things like
standing, on things like statutory interpretation, on things like the use of legislative
history, on various aspects of constitutional law, these are things that I had thought a
lot about and took very seriously before I ever came to the department and my views
were well known. I think it is because of those views that I was chosen. And I
simply continued to hold them.
A Special Interview with Solicitor General Charles Fried, 1 WASH. LAw., 48, 50 (1987).
30. Nominations of Joseph T. Sneed, of North Carolina, to be Deputy Attorney General and
Robert H. Bork, of Connecticut, to be Solicitor General. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1973) [hereinafter Bork Hearings]. For a discussion of
Solicitor General Bork's remarks, see infra note 232, and accompanying text.
31. Bork Hearings, supra note 30, at 13.
32. McClellan, supra note 21, at 2.
33. Id. at 14.
34. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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servative criticism of Fried similar to that earlier directed at Rex Lee.35
Although some of these disagreements have been sparked by dis-
putes about the merits of the particular cases at issue, they also reveal
very different views about the manner in which an independent Solicitor
General ought to use that independence. To those who have strongly
disagreed with many of the briefs filed by Solicitors General Lee and
Fried, it is tempting to try to formulate a set of guidelines for the Solici-
tor General's Office which, if accepted, would assure that few if any such
offending briefs would be filed in the future. But rules which emascu-
lated the Solicitor General's office would prevent it from doing good as
well as from doing harm. If a fresh analysis of the role of the Solicitor
General's office is to spawn more plausible and specific traditions which
might prevent the types of problems said to have occurred in recent
years, that analysis must be founded in part on a recognition that even an
ideal Solicitor General will, under a conservative administration, legiti-
mately file briefs with which liberals strongly disagree, and on a careful
attempt to distinguish differences over policy from disagreements about
the proper role of the Solicitor General as such.
This Article suggests that the Solicitor General has five quite dis-
tinct responsibilities: to provide the Supreme Court with accurate and
balanced information, to help to shape the Court's docket, to assure that
the government's presentations maintain a high level of professionalism,
to frame government positions which strike an appropriate balance be-
tween justice and advocacy, and to identify the interests and policies of
the government client whom he represents. These responsibilities at
times place the Solicitor General under conflicting obligations, not
merely conflicts between his or her duties to the Court and to the admin-
istration, but conflicts in the Solicitor General's obligations to different
agencies and factions within the executive branch. There is no simple or
general rule for resolving these problems; they are, rather, an ongoing
and unavoidable part of the work of the Solicitor General's office. Ad-
ministration and agency policies properly play a greater role in the fram-
ing of Supreme Court briefs than has generally been recognized; the
critical problem is not to insist that that role expand or contract, but to
define the circumstances when such policies ought and ought not be
among the factors considered by the Solicitor General, and to ascertain
what the policies and priorities of an administration may be on a given
issue. In order to strike the proper balance among these competing obli-
35. Legal Times, supra note 1.
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gations and policies, the Solicitor General must avoid becoming the per-
sonal partisan of any particular agency or of specific ideological goals.
II. INFORMING THE COURT: THE 38TH CLERK
The aspect of the Solicitor General's work that is most unlike that of
an ordinary litigator, and perhaps the most important to the Supreme
Court, is the Solicitor General's responsibility for. providing the Court, in
the words of 1977 OLC Memorandum, with "balanced summaries of the
records in the cases that are presented for review" and "an accurate and
expert statement of the legal principles that bear upon the questions to be
decided."' 36 The Court's need for such assistance is particularly great
because of the increase in the number of cases being brought to the Court
for review. Today the Court receives certiorari petitions, and in a much
smaller number of instances jurisdictional statements, in over 4,000 cases
a year.37 The sheer volume of these documents would overwhelm the
time and abilities of most mortal justices; if the average request for re-
view, response and annexed opinions totalled only 100 pages in length,
the volume of material to be read each week would exceed 8,000 pages.
The actual problem is both less and more serious than is suggested
by this figure. On the one hand, a mistake by the Supreme Court in
deciding which case to take is far less serious than an error in resolving a
case on the merits. A denial of certiorari, although often dispositive of
the claims of the immediate parties, sets no precedent binding on the
lower courts or the Supreme Court itself. If an issue raised by a petition
is of substantial importance, one of the critical factors in determining
whether review is appropriate, that issue is likely to arise again in an-
other case; thus the Court, if forced by a lack of time and understanding
to run a risk of error, can afford to err on the side of denying review. On
the other hand, the risk of such error is even higher than the sheer vol-
ume of litigation would suggest. Many petitions prepared by private
counsel lack either a discussion of the considerations that the Court re-
gards as relevant to the cert-worthiness of the case, an account of the
issues and history of the proceedings which would be comprehensible to
a justice or law clerk with limited time to devote to the case, or both.
Often considerable additional research or analysis is necessary to evalu-
ate the desirability of granting review, tasks which the Court is ordinarily
in no position to undertake. In the absence of such efforts the Court
36. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 231; see also Comment, supra note 10, at 1455
n.64, 1476.
37. 55 U.S.L.W. 3038 (1986) (4413 cases added to the Court's docket during October
Term, 1986).
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necessarily runs a substantial risk that it will agree to hear a number of
cases which, on closer examination, do not warrant review; each year the
Justices, after having granted review and invested the considerable time
necessary to master the briefs and appendices, conclude that they made a
mistake in taking a particular case, and dismiss the petition as improvi-
dently granted. The problems posed by pro se petitions are, understanda-
bly, even more severe.
In resolving the cases it agrees to hear on the merits, about 150 each
year,38 the Court has significantly more time, but the stakes for the Court
and the country are considerably higher. A Justice can devote on aver-
age no more than one working day to deciding how he or she will vote on
a given case, about enough time to read the briefs and lower court opin-
ions and to confer briefly with the Justice's law clerks or colleagues.39 In
some instances that will be sufficient time, but frequently it will not.
Often, if not ordinarily, the competence of the appellate counsel, particu-
larly in drafting their briefs, is of critical importance. In order to make a
sound decision about the resolution of a case, a Justice needs to have and
master a body of essential information-the factual circumstances of the
case, the legal framework in which the questions arise, the broader fac-
tual context in which the case must be considered, the ramifications of
the case for other litigation and areas of the law, and so on. Sometimes
all of this is self-evident, or apparent from the decision of the courts be-
low, but often it is not. Where additional information or analysis is es-
sential, and the parties do not provide it, the Court may be left to its own
devices to master thousands of pages of testimony, to explicate an ob-
scure and highly technical statutory scheme, to evaluate the state of the
law and the nature of the related issues in an unfamiliar area, or to pre-
dict the consequences of the various rules it is being urged to adopt.
The nine Justices, in assessing material of this sort, necessarily rely
heavily on the reading and research of their law clerks. But although the
Justices are authorized to select a total of thirty-seven clerks, there are
limits as well to what the clerks can do. The volume of material, of
course, makes it difficult for even the law clerks to research all or perhaps
most issues in depth, particularly in evaluating requests for review. The
law clerks, unlike the Justices for whom they work, have virtually no
legal experience, and ordinarily began their legal studies no more than
five years before their clerkship. Few law clerks will have mastered
38. Id.
39. If a Justice were to devote one day each to deciding how to vote on each case, that
would leave two days a week for reviewing certiorari opinions and writing opinions, tasks
which almost certainly consume considerably more time.
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many of the issues that come before the Court, and most will have no
greater understanding of the practical importance and impact of the is-
sues presented than would a moderately diligent reader of the New York
Times.
The resources which the Solicitor General has for addressing
problems of this sort differ from the resources of the Supreme Court in
three critical respects. First, although the Solicitor General's office itself
is small, today numbering only twenty-two lawyers other than the Solici-
tor General himself, the office can draw on the time and knowledge of
any of the tens of thousands of other attorneys within the executive
branch. The nature of an opaque tax statute, for example, can be eluci-
dated by a lawyer in the tax division; an attorney in one of the Justice
Department's divisions can be detailed to spend days or weeks summa-
rizing or evaluating a bulky record.' Even though this work product is
checked, reconsidered, and revised by the Solicitor General's office, the
task of that office is often made far easier and less time consuming by this
assistance. Second, the Solicitor General and his or her deputies have a
breadth of experience far greater than any law clerk, and the deputies,
who traditionally specialize in particular types of issues, frequently bring
to a case greater knowledge and expertise than most members of the
Court itself. Third, the Solicitor General's office, because it is not con-
strained by the restrictions applicable to the judiciary regarding ex parte
communications, can do research that would be impossible, or far more
difficult, for the Court. If some aspect of a record is unclear, or the cir-
cumstances in which a case arose are obscure, the Solicitor General's
office, unlike the Court, can simply telephone or meet with the relevant
attorney and often clear the matter up directly. The practical expertise,
knowledge and records of the entire array of federal agencies are avail-
able, at least in theory, to an attorney in the Solicitor General's office,
while the Court itself would often have no direct way of acquiring the
same information. Much of the information which the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office can obtain may in some appropriate manner be set forth in a
brief; where that would be inappropriate, the information may nonethe-
less help to shape the more general conclusions which the Solicitor Gen-
eral offers the Court.
40. Griswold, supra note 10, at 532.
[W]ell over 2000 different matters were passed upon by the Office of the Solicitor
General in the last... year ... [W]hat would be a literally impossible task for me
and my staff becomes practicable only as a result of the able and highly professional
assistance we receive from the functional divisions of the Department of Justice and
from the other departments and agencies involved.
Id; see also, Perlman, supra note 10, at 270; Stem I, supra note 10, at 154.
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Oftentimes the information which the Solicitor General can provide
the Court is essentially factual, albeit mixed with a degree of analysis and
evaluation-how often a particular problem arises, what the conse-
quences of a particular decision might be for the work of an affected
agency, and so forth. But the Solicitor General can also aid the Court by
offering a dispassionate scholarly analysis of the law, assisting the Court
to understand the nature of the various issues and subissues in a case,
pointing out the range of alternative conclusions which the Court might
adopt, and providing a balanced overview of the arguments and of the
relevant materials, such as cases or legislative history, which the Court
needs to consider in reaching a sound conclusion. Analyses of this sort
can be of considerable help to the Court in framing the issues it will
address and in structuring its evaluation of the contentions of the parties.
In some cases, of course, the issues may be sufficiently simple or familiar
to the Court that the Solicitor General would have little to offer, but in
other instances the complexity or novelty of the questions, possibly com-
bined with inadequate briefs from the parties other than the government,
may make such scholarly analysis invaluable.
A classic example of this informational role occurred in Cramer v.
United States,41 in which the petitioner's challenge to his treason convic-
tion turned in part on the history of the law of treason and the interpreta-
tion of the treason clause of article III.42 In addition to its brief, the
government commissioned and filed with the Court some 400 pages of
legal and historical analyses.., prepared at the request of the
... Solicitor General, in the main by persons not connected
with the Department of Justice, but believed to be fully quali-
fied by training and experience in the respective fields assigned
to them. The experts whose services were enlisted for this pro-
ject were the Chief of the Foreign Law Section of the Law Li-
brary of Congress, a Research Assistant in that Section, a
Professor of History of Canon Law at Catholic University,...
and an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Wisconsin.43
In submitting the studies to the Court, the government commented:
The authors of the appendices were requested to avoid argu-
mentative support of any particular position, and to select ma-
terial for inclusion or exclusion solely on the basis of its
41. 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
42. "No person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt act, or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
43. Perlman, supra note 10, at 285.
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reliability and its relevance to the questions under review by the
Court.... [W]e have chosen to present the studies to the Court
in the form in which they were prepared and submitted to us,
and we offer them as constituting in our judgment a fair, dis-
passionate and informative analysis of the history of the law of
treason. In so offering them we do not in any way assume re-
sponsibility for, or necessarily agree with, all the inferences
drawn or conclusions expressed by the authors.'
The Supreme Court, although ruling against the government, expressed
gratitude to the Solicitor General for having "lightened our burden of
examination of the considerable accumulation of historical materials. ' 45
The ability of the Solicitor General's office to play these often vital
informational roles depends heavily on the extent to which the Solicitor
General understands the Court's concerns and priorities. The Court in
some instances asks the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States,46 but it does not ordinarily present the Solicitor General
with written interrogatories or requests for the production of docu-
ments.47 The Solicitor General and his staff must be able to anticipate
the types of information which the Court will want and need, and the
kinds of analyses the Court will find of value. Anticipation of this sort
requires the Solicitor General's office to put aside the administration's
own agenda and values, where they may differ from those of the Court
itself, in order to focus on the matters of likely concern to the Justices.
The role which the Solicitor General plays in this respect is not that
of a tenth Justice, but of a thirty-eighth law clerk. The members of the
Supreme Court itself do not, with any consistency, provide in their opin-
44. Id. at 285-86.
45. 325 U.S. at 8 n.9.
46. During the 1986 Term the Court on 17 occasions invited the Solicitor General to ex-
press the views of the United States. Shell Oil Co. v. Director of Revenue, 108 S. Ct. 483
(1987); United Metal Prods. Corp. v. National Bank, 107 S. Ct. 3260 (1987); Continental Can
Co. v. Gavalik, 107 S. Ct. 3226 (1987); Bennett v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 1969 (1987); Puerto
Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1952 (1987); Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 107 S. Ct. 1623 (1987); Manufacturers Ass'n v. Knepper,
107 S. Ct. 1564 (1987); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 107 S,
Ct. 1345 (1987); Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1279 (1987);
Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 107 S. Ct. 641 (1986); Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
Board of Equalization, 107 S. Ct. 451 (1986); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 107 S. Ct. 267 (1986);
Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 107 S. Ct. 56 (1986); American Elec.
Power Co. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 56 (1986); Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 107 S. Ct. 56 (1986); Business
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 107 S. Ct. 55 (1986); AZL Resources, Inc. v. Margaret Hall
Found., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 55 (1986).
47. But see Comment, supra note 10, at 1471 n.135.
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ions an utterly balanced and dispassionate summary of the facts and is-
sues. On the contrary, and perhaps not surprisingly, judicial opinions,
especially when the Court is divided, are often as tendentious and one-
sided as the briefs of the litigants themselves. To the extent that the
Justices have in the past relied on the Solicitor General for a dispassion-
ate appraisal of the issues and facts of a case, they ask of the Solicitor
General a greater degree of fairness and objectivity than the Justices may
expect or at times receive, from one another. To the extent that a Solici-
tor General fails to meet that standard he or she significantly complicates
the work of the Court, and may fairly be criticized-but such a failure
occurs, not because the Solicitor General has failed to act like a tenth
Justice, but precisely because the Solicitor General has in fact done so.
It is not difficult to understand why the Supreme Court would want
the Solicitor General to act as a semi-permanent scholar-clerk, but it is
not self-evident why the Solicitor General would want to play that role.
The Solicitor General is after all, an advocate with clients to represent.
An ordinary advocate does not attempt to provide a neutral, dispassion-
ate summary of the facts or law, but points a court only to the evidence,
precedents or authorities which favor his or her client, largely ignoring
the material on the other side, and hoping that it will be overlooked, or
poorly presented, by opposing counsel. The problem is not one of delib-
erate misrepresentations, although they may occur, but of omission, a
failure to disclose or mention testimony, legislative history materials or
cases that are contrary to the interests of the party which the lawyer
represents. When the Solicitor General chooses to file a brief, the gov-
ernment does care about the outcome of the case; the government would
ordinarily settle any case whose outcome was a matter of indifference,
and would not file amicus briefs unless it had a preference as to the
proper disposition of at least some issue. Except in the extraordinary
cases in which there is essentially no serious argument to support the
contentions of the opposing party-cases so one-sided that they are un-
likely to come before the Supreme Court-there will always be a tension
between the Solicitor General's responsibility to inform the Court, and
the Solicitor General's desire to persuade the Court to reach a particular
result.
48
48. Solicitor General Cox describes a case in which the lawyer for a criminal defendant
had failed to object at trial, or attack on appeal, a jury instruction, patently inconsistent with
the fifth and sixth amendments, which authorized a jury to draw an inference of guilt from the
fact that two witnesses had claimed the privilege against self-incrimination:
Then the defendant filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to have the Supreme
Court review numerous questions, but never saying a word about the error in the.
charge. Now, what should the government do under these circumstances? There
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Despite the potentially adverse consequences for the government's
chances in any given case, however, the Solicitor General's office has
long sought to provide the Court with the sort of dispassionate factual,
and legal analysis that would serve the Court's needs. To some degree
this practice is a matter of tradition; Solicitor General Bork observed:
"[t]he Solicitor General, as you know, bears a special relationship to the
Court. He owes it complete intellectual candor even when that impairs
his effectiveness as an advocate.... To that tradition of this office I will
endeavor to adhere."'49 Solicitor General Fried commented more
recently:
In terms of the special relationship to the Court, the most
important part of that relationship comes from the scrupulous
accuracy of our submissions, that when a record is presented to
the Court, when the facts are stated to the Court, they should
be stated in the fullest possible way, all the warts completely
apparent.
I like to think that a statement by the Solicitor General's
brief of the facts and of the record is one which could be gladly
adopted by the opposing side."°
The type of candor to which Bork and Fried referred was not merely the
ethical duty of an attorney not to misrepresent facts or legal principles,
but a duty of complete and balanced disclosure that might be expected
of, although not necessarily met by, an academic or a judge. The willing-
ness of Solicitors General to apply to themselves standards more strin-
gent than would be expected of a private practitioner may stem, in part,
from that fact that eight of the last nine Solicitors General came to that
position from either the bench or law school faculties.5 1 The concern
was certainly an error of law in the charge. Whether the error was prejudicial, and
was so plain that the court [sic] should notice it, without assignment, might be sub-
ject to argument.
We had some differences among ourselves as to what we should do, but every-
one agreed that at the very least, it was our obligation to call the error to the atten-
tion of the Supreme Court, even though it might lead to reversal. Our difference was
on whether we should also argue that under all the rules of procedure the point was
not open to defendant, or we should ask the Supreme Court to reverse the judgment
and send it back to the First Circuit, so that it could consider whether the error,
which we suspected it had over-looked, was prejudicial. We took the latter course.
Cox, supra note 10, at 224. No private attorney would consider himself obligated to call to the
attention of the Court a potentially dispositive fact overlooked by opposing counsel.
49. Bork, The Problems and Pleasures of Being Solicitor General, 42 A.B.A. ANTITRUST J.
701, 705 (1973).
50. Oversight Hearings on the Solicitor General's Office and the U.S. Trustee Program,
House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, transcript
lines 246-54 (Stenographic Minutes no. HJU078050) (Mar. 19, 1987).
51. Solicitors General Sobeloff, Marshall and McCree were formerjudges. Solicitors Gen-
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with these standards is not unique to the Solicitor General's office; attor-
neys throughout the federal government ought to be, and at times are,
equally conscientious.
But there is a second, essentially pragmatic consideration which vir-
tually compels a Solicitor General, however litigious he or she may be by
temperament, to adhere to a level of candor far more stringent than that
common among ordinary attorneys. Virtually all other lawyers who
handle litigation in the Supreme Court are involved in only a single case,
or a handful of cases, in their entire careers; most law offices simply have
too little contact with the Court to permit the Justices to form, or recol-
lect, any firm judgment, for good or for ill, about the quality of their
work. An attorney who is unlikely to appear again in the Supreme Court
has little reason to worry about what impression he or she may be mak-
ing, so long as he or she does not say something so patently dishonest as
to harm his or her client or provoke a public denunciation at oral argu-
ment. The Court itself would certainly be pleased if the several thousand
lawyers who each year file with it only one or two briefs apiece were to
adhere to the sort of scholar-law-clerk standard described above, but pre-
cisely because those appearances are isolated the failure of any one attor-
ney to do so has only a de minimis impact on the Court's work.
But the relationship between the Solicitor General and the Court is
not a one-case-stand, but a permanent, indissoluble marriage; as passion-
ately as the Solicitor General may desire a particular result, he must also
worry about whether the Court will still respect him when the case is
over. What distinguishes the relationship between the Solicitor General
and the Supreme Court from the relationship of virtually any other attor-
ney to that, or any other court, is the extraordinary frequency with
which the Solicitor General's office participates in cases before the high
Court. Among the cases which the Court sets down for briefing and
argument, approximately 150 to 200 a year, the Solicitor General ap-
pears in about 65%; of these appearances, about two thirds are as a
party, and one third as an amicus.52 This is not a new phenomenon; in
1952 the government participated in 64% of all argued cases, although a
higher proportion of these were as a party rather than as an amicus,"
and in 1931 Solicitor General Thacher reported that the government was
eral Cox, Griswold, Bork, Lee and Fried were law school professors prior to becoming Solici-
tor General.
52. 1984 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 9.
53. 1959 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 43. Of the 66 cases in which the government partici-
pated in 1953, only 10 were as an amicus. 1964 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 55.
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a party in fully 60% of the cases resolved by the Court.5 4 The average
Justice writes a majority, concurring or dissenting opinion in no more
than 20% of the cases decided by the Court; the Solicitor General takes a
written public position three times as frequently. Lawyers for the United
States, most often members of the Solicitor General's office, argue in half
of the cases presented,5" appearing in about six different cases during
each week the Court sits for oral argument. Among the roughly 4,000
requests for review received by the Court each year, the United States
was a party, usually the respondent, in approximately 40% of the cases, a
level of participation that has existed for at least a quarter of a century;
56
the hundreds of written positions taken by the Solicitor General each
year with regard to certiorari petitions or jurisdictional statements dwarf
the handful of cases in which members of the Court themselves write
opinions commenting on decisions to grant or deny review.
This incessant government participation in Supreme Court cases has
two major, interrelated consequences. First, the quality of the Solicitor
General's presentation, particularly whether the Supreme Court can rely
on the Solicitor General to provide a balanced overview of the facts, is-
sues, and law in each case, has an enormous impact on the Court's work-
load. If the Solicitor General provides such information, as has generally
been the practice in years past, that reduces substantially the amount of
time the Justices and their law clerks may have to spend on research and
analysis, particularly in disposing of requests for review. The nature of
the Solicitor General's presentations in response to requests for review
are especially important, because hundreds of those requests are pro se
petitions which may be far from cogent, or even coherent.5 7 But whether
the Solicitor General is of material assistance to the Court turns, not on
whether the Solicitor General sometimes offers a dispassionate presenta-
tion of the facts and law, but whether the Solicitor General does so with
such unerring regularity as to give the Court confidence in the reliability
of his or her presentations. A Solicitor General who provides balanced
and complete information to the Court 50% of the time is only slightly
more helpful than one who does so 10% of the time--in either situation
54. Thacher, Genesis and Present Duties of Office of Solicitor General, 17 A.B.A. J. 519,
521 (1931).
55. Government attorneys argue in some, but not all, of the cases in which the United
States has filed an amicus brief.
56. See, eg., 1984 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 7; 1975 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 43; 1964
ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 55.
57. R. Stern & E. Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTiCE 541 n.1 (5th ed. 1978). The
current practice of the Solicitor General's office is to waive its right to respond to many pro se
petitions unless the Court itself requests a response.
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the Solicitor General's briefs would be sufficiently unreliable so that all of
their representations would have to be double checked. The Solicitor
General and the government may be under no greater legal or ethical
obligation to serve as a predictably balanced source of information than
is any private attorney, but a failure of the Solicitor General to do so has
far more severe consequences for the Court than similar conduct by an
ordinary practitioner, and would inevitably provoke the displeasure, if
not the wrath, of all the Justices, liberal and conservative alike.
The frequency with which the Solicitor General's office handles
cases in the Supreme Court also means that the Solicitor General and his
staff will over time develop in the minds of the Justices a reputation, for
good or ill, regarding the candor of their legal and factual presentations,
a reputation which will affect the general credibility of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's analyses and arguments, and thus the effectiveness with which the
office can represent the interests of the United States. If a private practi-
tioner, to save a weak or important case, bends the facts or law a bit, the
worst that can happen is that the tactic will hurt a claim which might
have been hopeless without a bit of legerdemain; but if the Solicitor Gen-
eral unsuccessfully attempts to do the same thing in some government
cases, the resulting impact on the Solicitor General's credibility may im-
pair for months or years the office's ability to advance the interests of the
government in other cases. If, in a given case, an ordinary lawyer incurs
the annoyance, or incredulity, of the Court, neither that attorney nor his
other clients will bear any adverse consequences. But if, on a Monday
morning, the Court begins to doubt the reliability of the representations
made by the Solicitor General's office, the odds are that another case
being argued by that same office will be heard Monday afternoon, and on
perhaps half a dozen occasions before the week is out, and those argu-
ments could be colored by concerns raised in the Court's mind by the
first presentation. Precisely because all of the Solicitor General's appear-
ances in the Supreme Court are on behalf of one overall client, the
United States, the Solicitor General must be concerned with how his
presentation of any single case on behalf of that client will affect the gov-
ernment's other interests in subsequent proceedings.
It is not enough that the Solicitor General's office refrain from mis-
representing the facts or the state of the law; just as other cases could be
hurt by a suspicion of mendacity, so too those other cases could well be
helped by a reputation for dispassionate scholarly analysis, a reputation
for being not only truthful but balanced and forthcoming. It is true, as
Solicitor General Bork observed, that absolute candor might impair in a
particular case the Solicitor General's effectiveness as an advocate, but a
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uniform practice of offering such dispassionate presentations would
clearly enhance the Solicitor General's general effectiveness. Thus, Solic-
itor General Thacher was making a tactical as well as an ethical point
when he insisted that he, like William Howard Taft, John W. Davis,
Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and others before him, had come "to regard
the interests of the Government as best served by an attitude toward liti-
gation of absolute candor and fair dealing ... 5.",8 But the Solicitor
General's traditional credibility with the Supreme Court has been ac-
quired, and can only be maintained, at a cost, because the degree of can-
dor involved will at times be harmful, perhaps fatally so, to the chances
of a particular agency in a specific case. A Solicitor General who con-
fesses error with considerable scrupulousness and regularity undoubtedly
by so doing adds to his or her stature with the Court, but not with any
agency, division or prosecutor whose hard won victory is sacrificed in
that cause.
The need to safeguard the Solicitor General's credibility is particu-
larly great because of the nature of the information which the Solicitor
General often wants to provide and which the Court often needs to have.
In addition to the state of the law and the evidence introduced in the
lower courts, the sound resolution of a case may turn on consideration of
factual information that is not in the record. The tradition of including
such materials in presentations in the Supreme Court is at least as old as
the famous brief filed by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon.5 9 The fac-
tual information or arguments in such briefs may be based on matters of
general knowledge, documents subject to judicial notice, or less authori-
tative sources. A Brandeis brief may be inconsistent to some degree with
strict adherence to the rules of evidence, but the Supreme Court recog-
nized long ago that when a decision will affect the lives of thousands or
millions of people, it ought to try to make the most informed decision
possible, rather than run the risk that it will come to the wrong result
because a lawyer representing the particular individuals before the Court
failed to introduce some critical document at trial.
58. Thacher, supra note 54, at 521.
59. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). In Muller, the Court stated:
It may not be amiss, in the present case, before examining the constitutional ques-
tion, to notice the... expressions of opinion from other than judicial sources. In the
brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis... is a very copious collection of all these
matters ....
[The brief included] extracts from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of
statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in this country and
in Europe ....
Id at 419 & n.1.
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For the Solicitor General this practice presents a special problem
and opportunity, because he or she also has access to the enormous
amount of information that is in the possession of the government offi-
cials, but which is outside the realm of materials that would be readily
available, or available at all, to any other litigant. Some of this govern-
ment information is documentary; in other instances it consists of facts
known to agencies or particular officials, or which can be ascertained by
federal officials through calculation or research. Information of this type
may be every bit as valuable to the Court, and to the Solicitor General's
arguments, as the more common materials that would be available to any
litigant in framing the sort of argument found in a Brandeis brief, but
utilization of this government information gives the United States a po-
tentially serious unfair advantage, because it may be difficult for the
Court or opposing counsel to confirm or dispute the accuracy of the So-
licitor General's assertions, or to assess the reliability of documents first
produced by the United States when a case is in the Supreme Court. Of
course there is unlikely to be any objection if the information provided by
the Solicitor General favors the opposing party, but the use of informa-
tion favorable to the government raises a different, and significant, prob-
lem. The possible unfairness is particularly great where the government
is a party to the case at issue, and could thus have offered the information
at trial, rather than an amicus participating in the litigation only after it
reaches the Supreme Court.
The willingness of the Supreme Court to credit information or asser-
tions of this sort depends largely, if not entirely, on the reliability and
perceived integrity of the Solicitor General's office. If the Court has
doubts about the Solicitor General's summary of a record, it can always
review the record itself and could conclude that the summary at issue,
however inaccurate past assertions might have been, was correct. But if
the Solicitor General makes an essential but undocumented assertion
about the practices of the IRS, or about the technology of heroin produc-
tion as it is understood by government narcotics experts,6° the Court
often has little choice but either to accept the assertion at face value, or
to disregard it entirely, since the Court may have no independent method
of verifying the representation. For that reason the reliability of asser-
tions of this sort by the Solicitor General's office must be absolutely be-
yond reproach, for if the Court were to doubt the accuracy or
completeness of even a few such representations, it would begin to disre-
gard all of them. Opposing counsel may not be able to carefully cross-
60. See, eg., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 412 nn.15, 16 & 18, 414 nn.24 & 26,
418 n.36, 419 n.37 (1970).
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examine the relevant officials, double-check their calculations and re-
search, and search their files for possibly inconsistent materials, but if the
Solicitor General's office itself does not do so the agency may fool the
Solicitor General, and the Court, and even prevail as a result, but the
long term consequences for the government would be extremely serious.
The potential importance of government representations regarding
the general factual background of a case is illustrated by the 1986 deci-
sion in Riverside v. Rivera.6 1 The question at issue in that case was
whether counsel fee awards under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 should be lim-
ited to a proportion of the monetary judgement won by a civil rights
plaintiff. Since the underlying purpose of the statute was to assure that
private counsel would be available to the victims of unconstitutional gov-
ernment action, the case turned to a significant degree on whether the
proposed limitation on fee awards would in practice have discouraged
private attorneys from representing plaintiffs with small claims. The
government had some basis for evaluating that essential issue, since fed-
eral lawyers frequently worked with private counsel in Title VII actions
in which counsel fees were sought and awarded. The Solicitor General
advised the Court that, although the plaintiffs in Riverside had won an
award of only $33,000, a proportionality rule would not in practice have
interferred with the stated purpose of the counsel fee statute: "'[t]he
prospect of recovering $11,000 for representing [respondents] in a dam-
ages suit (assuming a contingency rate of thirty-three percent) is likely to
attract a substantial number of attorneys.' ,62 Since the plaintiffs' coun-
sel in Riverside had expended nearly 2,000 hours over a ten year period, a
fee award of $11,000 would have yielded an hourly rate of $5.65.63 The
Solicitor General's suggestion that "a substantial number of attorneys"
would take a case paying $5.65 an hour, like the amusingly fictional
claims of television personality Joe Isuzu, was well calculated to get the
Court's attention, but not to be believed. The EEOC, the agency with
the most practical experience in this area, had expressly advised the So-
licitor General that a proportionality rule would in practice have the ef-
fect of making private counsel unavailable in certain cases.64 The
61. 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
62. Id. at 2697 n.10 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 23).
63. Id.
64. EEOC Memorandum on Award of Attorney's Fees and Brief of Justice Department to
Supreme Court in Case of City of Riverside v. Rivera, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at E-1 to
E-5 (Jan. 9, 1986) [hereinafter EEOC memo].
The memo stated:
[A] rule restricting the award of attorney's fees solely because the dollar amount of
damages is low.., would... discourage private attorneys from taking Title VII
cases which involve only individual claims.... The standard suggested... -that
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Solicitor General's assertion to the contrary cannot have increased the
Court's confidence in the reliability of government representations in
other cases.
Caplan notes the Solicitor General's practice of lodging non-record
documents with the Supreme Court has been criticized in some quarters
as giving the Solicitor General an unfair advantage since private attor-
neys are unaware that the Court accepts such submissions.65 This argu-
ment is somewhat overstated; the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, for
example, is well aware of the practice, and has utilized it for many years,
and other private attorneys do so as well, albeit more intermittently.
More fundamentally, however, the practice of lodging is a natural and
generally desirable side effect of the use of Brandeis brief arguments, for
it enables the Court and opposing counsel to examine critically the docu-
ments which a litigant might in any event have cited in its written argu-
ments. It is essential for the Court, and ultimately for the Solicitor
General, that any materials filed by the government be exhaustive and
balanced, encompassing all material favorable to the other side as well as
matters supporting the government; in the absence of procedures such as
have evolved in the trial courts under Brady v. Maryland,66 the Solicitor
General on his or her own initiative has an obligation to search for and
produce all relevant documents, in an absolutely unbiased manner, and
should not file documents supporting the government unless he or she is
able to vouch personally for their authenticity or reliability. If in any
past instance the document lodged to support an argument were insuffi-
ciently balanced or trustworthy, the government erred, not simply in
lodging the documents, but in making the argument which depended
upon those materials. There is, to be sure, some danger of abuse inherent
in this practice, but it would seem unwise to forbid the Solicitor General
to lodge non-record documents, or to provide the Court with information
outside the record, since any sensible Solicitor General will understand,
or quickly learn, that any such abuses would substantially impair the
ability of his or her office to effectively litigate subsequent cases.
There is, in sum, an almost inevitable conflict in any particular case
between the long-term interests of the United States, and the Solicitor
General's office, and the immediate interests of the agencies and officials
attorney's hours otherwise reasonable and necessary to the litigation should not be
fully compensated if their value exceeds the amount of damages recovered-will nec-
essarily... frustrate Congress's intent to award fees 'adequate to attract competent
counsel . . .' (Senate Report at 6), inasmuch as competent attorneys will have less
incentive to represent individual claimants who cannot finance their own litigation.
65. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 21-24.
66. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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involved in that specific case. It is a conflict raised to some degree by
every decision to include, or omit, facts or precedents that militate
against the government's position in a given case, and by every proposal
to stray from a standard of dispassionate scholarship in summarizing the
evidence or analyzing the state of the law. Agency officials, of course, are
not entirely devoid of ethical sensibilities, and not every deviation from
perfect balance will impair the Solicitor General's credibility, but the So-
licitor General must remain mindful of the inherent potential conflict
between the interests of agencies and officials who must be represented in
future cases, and the interests of the agencies or officials concerned pri-
marily, if not exclusively, to prevail in the case immediately at hand.
One of the great values of an independent Solicitor General's office is that
the very existence of that office institutionalizes a semi-adversarial pro-
cess in which different attorneys represent these distinct interests, the So-
licitor General's staff sensitive to the office's long term credibility, the
agency lawyer's anxious to win the case involved, and those differing in-
terests can be balanced and adjusted in a relatively open and deliberate
process.
III. SHAPING THE CouRT'S DOCKET: THE FOURTH JUSTICE
Another of the Solicitor General's most critical responsibilities-to
the Court and to the government-stems from the manner in which the
Supreme Court selects the cases which it will hear and decide. The
Court does not simply peruse recent volumes of Federal Reporter Sec-
ond, or state reports, and choose cases that strike its fancy. The Court's
role is an essentially passive one-the Justices limit their choices to cases
in which one of the parties has decided to ask for review, and are, as we
have seen, quite dependent on the judgment of counsel, especially coun-
sel for petitioners, both regarding what question is presented by a case,
and for information bearing on the petition's certworthiness. Like a
baseball hitter who can decide whether or not to swing at a ball, but
cannot force the pitcher to throw strikes, the Court can refuse to hear a
case proposed by counsel, but it cannot ordinarily take on an issue no one
is asking it to resolve. The Court has considerably less control over this
process than it does over the outcome of the cases which it ultimately
decides on the merits, yet what issues the Court decides is often as impor-
tant to the development of the law as how the Court actually decides
them.
The pivotal role of the Solicitor General is reflected in two statistics.
For at least the last quarter century, approximately twenty-five percent
of the cases decided on the merits by the Supreme Court had been taken
1210
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at the behest of the Solicitor General,67 and the Court now agrees to
review about 75% of the cases in which the government seeks certio-
rari.68 The very large proportion of government petitions granted by the
67. Each year, in addition to the petitions granted and set for briefing and argument, a
number of petitions are granted and disposed of summarily; most of these summary disposi-
tions are orders remanding the case for reconsideration in light of some recent Supreme Court
decision. A number of appeals are summarily remanded for similar reasons. The proportion
of argued cases in which the Government participated as either a petitioner or an appellant
was as follows:
Term Total Cases Argued U.S. Petitioner or Appellant
1952 141 43 (30.5%)
1953 116 27 (23.3%)
1954 105 26 (24.8%)
1955 123 22 (17.9%)
1956 145 30 (20.7%)
1957 154 30 (19.5%)
1958 143 24 (16.8%)
1959 130 38 (29.2%)
1960 147 24 (16.3%)
1961 136 22 (16.2%)
1962 150 27 (18.0%)
1963 144 32 (22.2%)
1964 122 33 (27.0%)
1965 131 35 (26.7%)
1966 150 30 (20.0%)
1967 179 33 (18.4%)
1968 139 25 (18.0%)
1969 144 26 (18.1%)
1970 151 33 (21.9%)
1971 173 37 (21.4%)
1972 177 40 (22.6%)
1973 170 37 (21.8%)
1974 173 50 (28.9%)
1975 179 44 (24.6%)
1976 176 29 (16.5%)
1977 164 35 (21.3%)
1978 168 29 (17.3%)
1979 156 43 (27.6%)
1980 154 31(20.1%)
1981 184 30 (16.3%)
1982 183 44 (24.0%)
1983 184 46 (25.0%)
1984 175 37 (21.1%)
1985 171 39 (22.8%)
1985-1986 SOLiCrrOR GEN. ANN. REP., table HI; 1984 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 9; 1970
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Court contrasts sharply with the Court's treatment of other petitions,
less than five percent of which are granted.69 In an average term the
Solicitor General files about forty petitions, all but a half dozen of which
are granted. The Solicitor General's office also files amicus briefs in sup-
port of five to ten non-federal petitions a year, and these petitions fare
about as well as those filed by the United States itself.7 0 Caplan suggests
that under Solicitor General Fried's tenure the government's petitions
lost credibility with the Court. Whatever problems may or may not have
1956 42 31(74%) 21 15 (71%)
1957 31 20 (65%) 8 4 (50%)
1958 40 33 (83%) 13 10 (77%)
1959 32 24 (75%) 5 5 (100%)
1960 33 16 (48%) 6 6 (100%)
1961 33 23 (70%) 12 10 (83%)
1962 29 21(72%) 15 11 (73%)
1963 29 16 (55%) 9 8 (89%)
1964 36 29 (81%) 9 7 (78%)
1965 30 21(70%) 17 13 (76%)
1966 30 25 (83%) 9 5 (56%)
1967 38 24 (63%) 11 8 (73%)
1968 27 22 (81%) 5 3 (60%)
1969 37 19 (51%) 20 12 (60%)
1970 45 31(69%) 20 11 (55%)
1971 39 27 (69%) 14 10 (71%)
1972 52 36 (69%) 21 9 (43%)
1973 61 39 (64%) 14 11 (79%)
1974 66 47 (71%) 14 10 (71%)
1975 50 38 (76%) 11 8 (73%)
1976 48 37 (77%) 17 5 (29%)
1977 57 33 (58%) 11 3 (27%)
1978 52 37 (71%) 8 5 (63%)
1979 55 43 (78%) 10 7 (70%)
1980 50 31(62%) 10 8 (80%)
1981 56 45 (80%) 17 12 (71%)
1982 66 39 (59%) 8 6 (75%)
1983 38 30 (79%) 7 4 (57%)
1984 36 29 (81%) 7 4 (57%)
1985 41 34 (83%) 10 9 (90%)
1985-1986 SOLICITOR GEN. ANN. REP. tables II-A and II-B; 1984 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 7-
8; 1970 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 38-39; 1963 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 50.
69. In the 1985 Term the Court granted 108 of the 3802 petitions which were neither filed
nor supported by the United States. 1985-1986 SOLicrroR GEN. ANN. REP. table II-A.
70. In the last five terms the number of such amicus briefs, and the disposition of the
petitions, were as follows:
Government
Amicus Briefs In Supported
Term Support of Petitions Petitions Granted
1981 16 12 (75%)
1982 14 12 (86%)
1983 9 7 (78%)
1984 6 5 (83%)
1985 7 4 (57%)
Id.
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arisen in specific cases, there appears to be no evidence of a general de-
cline in the rate in which government petitions were granted. In the 1985
Term, Fried's most controversial, the Court granted eighty-three percent
of the government's petitions, a rate not exceeded by any Solicitor Gen-
eral in the previous twenty-five years.7 1
There are two somewhat interrelated reasons for the extraordinary
but consistent frequency with which the Court grants petitions filed by
the Solicitor General. The first is that the Solicitor General, in selecting
the cases in which review will be sought, generally attempts to apply the
same standards which the Court itself utilizes in passing on petitions.
Justice Frankfurter insisted that the Solicitor General had an obligation
to do so.
The various Governmental agencies are apt to see deci-
sions adverse to them from the point of view of their limited
preoccupation and too often are eager to seek review from ad-
verse decisions which should stop with the lower courts. The
Solicitor General, however, must take a comprehensive view in
determining when certiorari should be sought. He is therefore
under special responsibility, as occupants of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office have recognized, to resist importunities for review
by the agencies, when for divers reasons unrelated to the merits
of a decision, review ought not be sought.7"
Another source at the Court insisted that "'tlhe Solicitor General
should guard the gate.' "7 Many of the Solicitors General who have
served in that office during the last half century have expressly agreed
with this view.74 This practice is of enormous assistance to the Court,
which would be even further swamped with petitions if the government
71. See supra note 68.
72. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 764 n.9 (1948).
73. Lewis, Our Extraordinary Solicitor General, THE REPORTER, May 5, 1955, at 27, 29.
74. Solicitor General Griswold stated:
[Tihe government presents to the Supreme Court only those cases that meet the
Court's own exacting standards for review... In this period of increasing court
congestion, and the Supreme Court's own concern over its rapidly mounting docket
which makes it so difficult for the Court adequately to consider all the cases it is
asked to review, it is particularly important that the Court have presented to it on
behalf of the government only those cases that appear appropriate for the Court to
review.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on HR. 5050 and HR. 340, Bills to Amend the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; to Provide Authorizations for Appropriations for the Securities and Exchange Comm. for
Fiscal Years 1974, 1975, and 1976; and for Other Purposes, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 278 (1973)
(testimony of Solicitor General Griswold) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings].
Solicitor General Stern stated:
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sought review in every one of the hundreds of cases it loses each year in
In determining whether to petition for certiorari the Solicitor General ... attempts to
apply the Supreme Court's standards....
The reasons underlying this traditional approach by the Solicitor General are
partly self-serving and partly not....
A heavy additional burden would be imposed on the Court if the Government,
with its great volume of litigation, disregarded that policy and acted like the normal
litigant who wants to take one more shot at reversing a decision which is obviously
wrong because he lost.
Stem I, supra note 10, at 155.
Solicitor General Cox noted that:
A[n]... area in which the differences between the role of the ordinary lawyer and of
the government's Supreme Court lawyers is very apparent, is deciding what cases to
take to the Court upon petition for a writ of certiorari....
We are much stricter in applying the conventional standards for seeking certio-
rari as set forth in the Court's rules ....
Cox, supra note 10, at 225-26.
Solicitor General Griswold also noted that:
These figures [as to the success rate of government petitions] are not cited to show
any special prowess on the part of the Solicitor General in presenting cases to the
Court. They illustrate, rather, the success of our policy of pruning from the cases
lost in the courts of appeals the decisions that properly went against us or that, even
if believed in error, are not of general significance. Less than one case in ten lost in
the court of appeals becomes the subject of a government certiorari petition .... I
... believe that our record in having certiorari granted comes from the objective
soundness of our assessment that the case is, in the jargon of our highly specialized
trade, "certworthy."
Griswold, supra note 10, at 535.
Solicitor General Perlman commented that:
[S]ince it is necessary not to swamp the Supreme Court with more business than it
can handle, the Solicitors General, in order to assist the Court to function efficiently
and expeditiously as a vital segment of our governmental structure, have long recog-
nized the wisdom, from the standpoint of the general public interest, of attempting to
bring before the Court only those cases in which there seems to be real need for
Supreme Court adjudication.
Perlman, supra note 10, at 266-67.
Solicitor General Thacher stated:
[The Solicitor General] has.., a peculiar responsibility to the Court, in taking infi-
nite pains to see that the cases presented are only such as are worthy of its review.
This responsibility is assumed not only in considering whether the Government shall
ask review, but in opposing, or concluding not to oppose, petitions for certiorari filed
by adverse parties.
Thacher, supra note 54, at 521.
Hearings on H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470 and H.R. 2271 before Subcomm No. 3 and 4 of the
House Judiciary Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1949) (statement of Solicitor General Perl-
man) [hereinafter 1949 House Hearings]:
We deal with the Supreme Court all the time on questions of applications for
writ of certiorari. And I think that the experience that those in the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office have enables them to consider those questions with a degree of judgment
as to what not only is possible to present to the court but what is probable ....
Lots of times we think that an application would be rejected by the Supreme
Court and we think it is proper not to present it ....
We save the Government, we think, and we save the Supreme Court, a lot of
unnecessary effort and expense by only filing applications which we think we have a
reasonable chance of having granted.
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the appellate courts, rather than in only a few dozen. But this approach
is also sound advocacy, for there would ordinarily be no point in filing a
petition in a case which the Solicitor General had every reason to know
the Court would not agree to hear.
The government's petitions also fare well because the Solicitor Gen-
eral's recommendations have traditionally carried considerable weight
with the Court. Former acting Solicitor General Robert Stern noted:
It is hoped and believed-although no one who has not been on
the Court can be sure-that the Court will realize that the So-
licitor General will not assert that an issue is of general impor-
tance unless it is-and that confidence in the Solicitor
General's attempt to adhere to the Court's own standards will
cause the Court to grant more Government petitions.75
Justice Stevens indicated during a recent oral argument that the Solicitor
General's views do indeed carry weight with the Court.76 The degree of
deference shown to government petitions is, of course, subject to any vi-
cissitudes in the relationship between the Solicitor General and the
Court. Regardless of what problems may or may not have occurred in
recent years, the proportion of government petitions granted by the
Court would certainly decline if the Solicitor General were to ifie a signif-
icant number of palpably uncertworthy petitions, or were to fie petitions
in 100 cases a term, regardless of whether all of them warranted serious
consideration by the Court. On the other hand, the Solicitor General's
office has an unparalleled degree of experience with and understanding of
the certiorari process; every term it considers several hundred agency
proposals for certiorari petitions and receives more than a thousand peti-
75. Stern I, supra note 10, at 156.
76. The following colloquy occurred in a discussion of why the Supreme Court had
granted a stay at an earlier stage of the proceedings:
QUESTION: But isn't it true on the stay, just reflecting, I don't remember the
particular application, but this is a case that involved a great deal of money, did it
not? Fifty or sixty or seven [sic] million dollars?
Mr. Merrill: It involved $60 million.
QUESTION: The government also comes in in these cases. Don't we almost
routinely grant the stays with that kind of fact pattern?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 255 (1987) (No. 86-1512).
The fact that the Court would "routinely" grant such a stay when requested by the Solici-
tor General is significant because stays are not ordinarily granted unless there is "a reasonable
probability that four members of the Court will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to
grant certiorari.. . ." Graves v. Barnes, 405 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1972). See also Study of the
Securities Industry, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1809-10 (1971) (Let-
ter of Chief Justice Burger) ("[Tihe Solicitor General exercises a highly important role in the
selection of cases to be brought here in terms of the long-range public interest.").
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tions filed in cases the government won below. The Solicitor General, if
inclined out of a sense of obligation or enlightened self-interest to utilize
the Supreme Court's own standards, can be of great assistance to the
Justices in selecting from the thousands of government cases in the lower
courts the handful that warrant consideration by the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General's views might matter less if each year, out of
perhaps 4,000 certiorari petitions, there were 150 that clearly warranted
review, and 3,850 which just as obviously did not. But the petitions filed
with the Court do not divide in this manner. Each year there are perhaps
a few dozen cases which undeniably ought to be heard by the Court, and
a far larger group, possibly several hundred, which appear to be moder-
ately certworthy.7 7 The choices that must be made within this latter
group depends in part on a more detailed inquiry into the facts and legal
context of each case, and in part on a judgmental evaluation of the over-
all importance of the issues which it raises. The views of a Solicitor Gen-
eral who understands the concerns and criteria'of the Court can be
particularly helpful in making selections within this larger group of ar-
guably certworthy cases.
But the Solicitor General's recommendations may also be signifi-
cant, and entitled78 to weight, because they reflect not only the Court's
own criteria, but also the policies of the executive branch. The Solicitor
General's informational role is one which is best filled without regard to
the priorities or interests of executive agencies. But the evaluation of the
importance of a case-to the country, to the functioning of the federal
government, to the development of the law-is not so bloodless a task. A
given agency, limited to seeking review in a single case a year, would
make that choice in part based on the relative priority which it attached
to the various issues involved. Thus a conservative NLRB might select a
case in which it had sought to expand the prerogatives of management,
while a liberal NLRB might look for a vehicle to increase the protections
afforded to union members. Because the executive branch is the arm of
the national government responsible for the execution of federal law,
considerable weight ought to be accorded to the views of that branch
regarding which aspects of federal law require further explication. The
Solicitor General has an obligation to the Court to keep down the
77. See Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities:
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 681 (1984).
78. See 1973 House Hearings, supra, note 74, at 288 ("I would say the Court can't hear a
fourth of the cases that are worthy of consideration by a national court. In that situation, an
office in the Government which helps to filter out the cases and to get before the Court those
which are really of that first importance .... ").
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number of requests for review, and to limit the requests to cases which
are arguably certworthy, but so long as the selections are made within
that group, whatever the executive branch regards as important to the
attainment of its policies might presumptively be regarded as important
by the Court as well.
The Solicitor General's ability to shape the Court's docket is compa-
rable to, and conceivably even greater than, that of any single member of
the Court itself. So far as is known the Justices do not accord to one
another the degree of deference shown to the Solicitor General concern-
ing which cases to review; in the 1985 Term there were several hundred
cases in which the Court denied review over the objection of one or more
Justices,79 but only seven cases in which the Court declined to review a
petition filed or supported by the Solicitor General. 0 The views of any
given Justice are decisive only when the other eight members of the
Court are divided five-three against granting certiorari; when that occurs
the disposition of the case will turn on whether the remaining Justice
sides with the minority and provides the fourth vote needed to hear the
case. The power actually exercised by the Solicitor General is compara-
ble to that of the fourth Justice in that situation, although the Solicitor
General may be in a position to exercise that power more often than any
actual member of the Court itself. Of course, the executive branch may
at times want to embroil the Court in issues which the Court prefers to
avoid; when that occurs the Justices are free to reject the Solicitor Gen-
eral's recommendations. But so long as the Solicitor General proposes
review of only a modest number of arguably certworthy cases, the Solici-
tor General does the Court no disservice by making those selections in
part on the basis of administration policy; indeed, it would probably be
impossible to make such selections without doing so.
The Solicitor General's responsibility to select the small number of
cases in which review will be sought requires him or her to face and
resolve unavoidable conflicts among the interests of the numerous federal
agencies aggrieved each year by lower court decisions. The filing of a
palpably uncertworthy petition, however important the issue to the
agency involved, would necessarily compromise the weight which the So-
licitor General's recommendations would carry in subsequent cases in
which the Solicitor General represents other agencies."1 Solicitor Gen-
79. The orders denying the petitions in October Term, 1985, are set out in volumes 89-92
of Lawyers Edition, Second.
80. See supra note 68. There were 41 government petitions fied. A total of 34 petitions
were granted. Id
81. Solicitor General Griswold explained his reasons for declining to seek review of a case
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eral Cox observed that: "One who is much stricter in deciding when to
ask for certiorari, is bound to have a better batting average"; 82 it is
equally true that, a hitter known to swing at bad pitches is taken consid-
erably less seriously. But more is involved than merely the need to avoid
submitting frivolous petitions; choices must be made among the arguably
certworthy cases. If the Court were to announce that each year it would
grant certiorari in forty, and only forty, cases of the Solicitor General's
choice, or in whichever ten non-goverment cases the Solicitor General
chose to support with an amicus brief, the nature of the conflict, and the
need for policy related decisions, would be starkly apparent. 83 The ac-
tual process, with decisions made on a rolling basis, and the Solicitor
General's office itself required to screen out the cases that are clearly
unworthy of review, masks to some degree the nature of the problem.
But in the final analysis the selection of cases in which review will be
recommended requires the Solicitor General to assess not only the con-
cerns of a given agency, but also the overall policies and priorities of the
entire administration, for the Solicitor General must choose to pursue
litigation regarding certain agencies and programs at the cost of aban-
doning cases involving other departments or activities.84 The selection of
cases in which review will and will not be sought, like the selection of
agencies whose budgets will be increased or decreased, necessarily and
properly reflects to some degree the particular priorities of each adminis-
tration. The Solicitor General has an obligation to both the Court and
the administration to make his or her decisions in light of the full array
of executive branch interests or policies, rather than favoring the particu-
lar priorities of a particular agency or division of the Justice Department;
a Solicitor General who placed undue emphasis, say, on seeking review in
he thought uncertworthy in such terms: "The Solicitor General has only so much capital with
the Court and, if we spent some of it on this case, it would almost surely be wasted because
there was no real prospect that the Court would take the case, in the judgment of my office,
.... " 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 276.
82. Cox, supra note 10, at 226.
83. Solicitor General Griswold noted: "the pressure that we are under to try to hold down
the cases which are sought to be taken before the Supreme Court because that has become so
massive that unless we are extremely careful we may not get in some fairly important cases
that we ought to get in." 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 295.
84. Former Solicitor General Sobeloff stated:
A sometimes bothersome feature of the solicitor general's duty of deciding what busi-
ness to present to the Supreme Court is dealing with the government agencies con-
cerned. His is the task of resisting their tearful importunities to seek review of cases
they have lost. The loss seems to them calamitous. Their preoccupation is with the
immediate result, or at least their purview is likely limited to their particular work.
The solicitor general must seek a broad perspective of the total law business of the
United States, not merely the program of any single agency.
Sobeloff II, supra note 10, at 151.
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Social Security cases would do so at a significant cost to other federal
agencies and programs.
It will not always be clear how a Solicitor General is to assess the
comparative importance of different agencies and programs. In order to
select the thirty or forty most important cases in a given year, the Solici-
tor General not only must evaluate the impact of a particular issue on a
given agency, but also must decide which policies and practices are to be
given priority consideration. These assessments might well be better
made by the cabinet, or the President, if the interrelated legal issues-
e.g., is this issue a little, moderately, or very certworthy? What will be
the actual legal impact of the lower court decision? Is another case rais-
ing the same issue likely to come along soon?---could be separated out,
but often such distinctions are impracticable. The final decisions ordina-
rily fall to the Solicitor General's office, both because policy and legal
issues cannot readily be separated, and because of the institutional
problems which would arise if agencies unhappy with a Solicitor Gen-
eral's refusal to authorize certiorari petitions in their particular cases
could go over the Solicitor General's head to appeal to policymakers.
A rather different potential conflict, between the interests of the
Court and those of the government, arises when a decision against the
government presents a certworthy issue, but the Solicitor General con-
cludes that the circumstances of the case make it a poor vehicle for liti-
gating that particular question. There has been some disagreement about
whether the Solicitor General's obligations to the Court would require
the Solicitor General to seek review of such a case. In 1973 Solicitor
General Griswold testified at a House hearing that his office deliberately
avoided seeking review in cases of that sort:
One of the major considerations the Solicitor General applies in
deciding whether to ask the Supreme Court to hear a case is the
suitability of the case as a vehicle for deciding the issue. Bad
facts frequently color the Court's reaction to the legal issues,
and it has been the experience of the office over many years that
the government is ill-advised to litigate in the Supreme Court
an important legal issue in a factual context in which the
Court's sympathies are likely to be with the other side."5
At his Senate confirmation hearing the same year, Solicitor General Bork
took a somewhat different approach. "I do not see how a Solicitor Gen-
eral who imposed his own views upon the appeal process and kept cases
from the Court that the Court thinks it ought to have, could conceivably
85. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 279.
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retain the trust of that Court." 6 Ironically, however, one of the few
recent incidents in which the Solicitor General's office was criticized for
keeping a case from the Supreme Court occurred when Bork was Solici-
tor General. 7 While the Supreme Court may believe that the impor-
tance of a particular issue would warrant a grant of certiorari, the Court
is unlikely to object to the Solicitor General's efforts to present that issue
in a case whose circumstances favor the government, so long as the Solic-
itor General's attempt to await a more propitious case does not prevent
the Court from considering the issue in a timely fashion, but merely
works a brief postponement in that consideration.
Another institutionally delicate problem arises when the entity
pressing the Solicitor General to seek certiorari is an independent agency
to which Congress has by statute given authority to set its own policies
and priorities without regard to the views of the President or the execu-
tive departments. The Solicitor General's statutory authority for han-
dling virtually all Supreme Court litigation on behalf of the United States
literally entails the power to make litigation decisions, not only on behalf
of officials and agencies accountable to the President, but also on behalf
of independent agencies.88 There will at times be direct, even vitupera-
tive disagreements between independent agencies and either the White
House or other executive branch officials; such agencies are by statute
accorded independence precisely because Congress believed that their
work was likely to give rise to such disputes. The Solicitor General's
litigation authority could in theory be used, in such occasions, to impose
on an independent agency the views of the administration, if he refused,
86. Bork Hearings, supra note 30, at 11. Previous Solicitors General had shared Bork's
view. Former Solicitor General Archibald Cox stated that: "[In deciding what cases to take
to the Court, you hear lawyers in the office frequently say, 'Well, is this a case that would be
good for the Court to have,' rather than 'Is this a case that it would be good for us to have the
Court consider.'"
Cox, supra note 10, at 223.
Also, former Solicitor General Perlman asserted:
The Solicitor General would not perform his duty to the Government or to the peo-
ple if he took to the Supreme Court only cases which he thought would add to the
Government's score of victories. Cases often involve questions of such importance
that the public interest requires that they be brought to the Supreme Court for settle-
ment or clarification, irrespective of the chances of winning the particular
controversies.
Perlman, supra note 10, at 267.
87. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1975, at A34, col. 5 (Sen. Edward Kennedy on pocket
veto issue); id., Jan. 24, 1975, at A30, col. 5 (Solicitor General Bork on pocket veto issue); id.,
Nov. 10, 1974, at A44, col. I (Ford criticized on pocket veto); L.A. Times, Nov. 1, 1974, pt. 2,
at 6, col. 3 (criticism of Ford pocket veto issue).
88. The earliest exception is the authority conferred by statute on the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to handle its own cases in the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1982).
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for example, to authorize the filing of a certiorari petition because the
administration was pleased that a particular agency practice or action
had been overturned by the lower courts. Such a policy-based refusal
would squarely pose a conflict between the Solicitor General's general
authority to supervise Supreme Court litigation and the more specific
statutory charter guaranteeing the independence of the agency involved.
Regardless of how such a legal dispute might be resolved, even as-
suming that some judicial forum could be found to resolve it, past Solici-
tors General have generally recognized that they ought not use their
supervisory authority to impinge in this manner on the autonomy of in-
dependent agencies. A 1966 study concluded that the Solicitor General
was authorizing approximately sixty-five percent of the certiorari peti-
tions requested by independent agencies, compared to only twenty per-
cent of the petitions sought by other executive agencies.89 In 1973,
Solicitor General Griswold advised Congress that his office was approv-
ing about seventy-six point six percent of the proposed petitions submit-
ted by independent agencies,90 and was disapproving such petitions only
if he thought the issues were not certworthy, or provided a weak case in
which to litigate the questions presented. If the question which an
agency wanted the Court to consider were a certworthy one, but the So-
licitor General was unable in good conscience to present the legal argu-
ments the agency wished to make, "the customary practice has been for
the Solicitor General himself not to sign the brief but to authorize the
agency to represent itself."9 In 1983, when Solicitor General Lee de-
clined to authorize a certiorari petition to review a circuit court decision
overturning a controversial Consumer Product Safety Commission or-
der, Lee made a point of assuring the agency in writing that his decision
did "not reflect any disagreement with the merit of the commission's de-
cision."92 The potential for conflict between independent agencies and
an administration, however, is unavoidable, and when those conflicts do
arise the Solicitor General should decline to file or authorize the filing of
a certiorari petition only where necessary to protect the Court from an
uncertworthy case.93
89. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1454 (quoting study).
90. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 272, 281 (from the years 1963 to 1973, Solicitor
General filed petitions in 98 of 128 instances in which agencies requested such action).
91. Id. at 281.
92. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1983, at A13, col. 3. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1458 ("If
the basis of the Solicitor General's decision [not to fie a petition] is founded on policy differ-
ences, the agency should be able to appeal on its own, since the Solicitor General is no longer
protecting the Court from cases clearly unworthy of its consideration.").
93. This tradition has not been followed with complete uniformity. In one instance the
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IV. SENIOR PARTNER
Many aspects of the Solicitor General's work derive from the special
relationship of that office to the Supreme Court, and from the unique
nature of the Solicitor General's client. But the Solicitor General also
functions, of necessity, as the ranking attorney responsible for supervis-
ing appellate litigation, a role that in some ways is similar to that of the
senior litigation partner in a private firm. The Solicitor General ordina-
rily exercises final authority over the tactical judgments about how best
to prevail in a given case or regarding a particular issue. The framing of
a brief often involves a large number of these decisions-which argu-
ments to advance, what concessions to make, whether to seek a broad or
narrow opinion, and so on. Lawyers can disagree endlessly about such
matters, their disputes sometimes reflecting conflicting styles and judg-
ments and sometimes masking philosophical or political disagreements.
As former acting Solicitor General Robert Stern observed, in the govern-
ment, as in private practice, "the final decision must be made
somewhere."94
The Solicitor General has for several distinct reasons been accorded
the responsibility for making those legal judgments. First, the handling
of Supreme Court litigation requires a considerable degree of expertise
that does not generally exist among government attorneys outside of the
Solicitor General's office, an understanding not only of such narrow pro-
cedural questions as the type of case the Court will deem certworthy, but
more broadly of the types of reasoning and concerns likely to sway the
Court's decisions on the merits of a case. Attorney General Clark once
observed:
Very few lawyers, as you well know, ever argue a case in the
Supreme Court of the United States. It is a procedure that is
foreign for many lawyers. I am sure that if you could see some
of the briefs and applications that are filed there, you would
understand just what I mean when I say that you have to have
someone that knows his business when he gets to the Supreme
Court.
95
Solicitor General refused to permit the filing of a petition, which he acknowledged raised a
certworthy issue of national importance, because he personally agreed with the decision of the
court of appeals. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1456.
94. Stern I, supra note 10, at 218.
95. Providing For the Review of Orders of Certain Agencies, and Incorporating into the
Judicial Code Certain Statutes Relating to Three-Judge District Courts: Hearings Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 and Subcomm. No. 4 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives on
H.R. 1468, H.R. 1470, and H.R. 2271 and Before Subcomm No. 2 on H.R. 2915 and H.R.
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Because of their different role within the federal judiciary, for example,
the Justices are less likely than circuit judges to be concerned with rele-
vant, but not controlling, Supreme Court precedents, and more likely to
be sensitive to the practical consequences of their decisions; an attorney
whose career has been limited to the lower courts might well be unfamil-
iar with such differences. Second, not all federal employees who have
passed the bar have the same ability to write appellate briefs; the differ-
ences reflect variations in both innate talent and in legal experience. The
Solicitor General's office traditionally recruits particularly gifted attor-
neys, and necessarily provides them with a degree and type of brief-writ-
ing experience that is unique in the legal profession. Third, because the
Solicitor General's staff must represent a wide variety of federal agencies
and officials, it is better able, and more likely, to frame the government's
position in light of the total law business of the United States, rather than
simply from the perspective of a single agency or program manager. Fi-
nally, because the Solicitor General's office is not ordinarily involved in a
case before it reaches the Supreme Court,9 6 the Solicitor General and his
or her staff can evaluate the issues and arguments from a fresh, more
objective perspective than might be possible for agency attorneys who
had been fighting the same case for years.
These considerations are somewhat analogous to the concerns which
often prompt large private institutions to turn to outside counsel to han-
dle major litigation. One would not expect this sensible allocation of re-
sponsibility for overseeing Supreme Court cases to occasion any
substantial controversy, and until recently it did not. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, however, much of the criticism and debate since 1981 about the
Solicitor General's office has focused on whether the Solicitor General
had played, or should play, the sort of role which was commonplace in
the past.
That the final decisions regarding legal tactics and arguments should
be left in the hands of the Solicitor General seems a matter of organiza-
tional and professional common sense. The Attorney General often will
be less skilled than the Solicitor General in making those judgments.
2916, 80th & 81st Cong. 125 (1949) [hereinafter 1949 Hearings]. See also 1973 House Hear-
ings, supra note 74, at 274, wherein Solicitor General Griswold commented:
we inevitably embody a very large amount of experience in Supreme Court work, not
only with respect to its practice but with respect to the types of arguments which
seem to be effective, and I think that reservoir of experience in the Solicitor General's
Office is a very important asset to the Government.
Id.
96. In some instances the Solicitor General's office will have been involved because it was
required to assent to an appeal from an adverse district court opinion.
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Frequently the Attorney General will have been selected because of his
policy-making and management skills; at worst he may have been chosen
simply because he was a personal friend or confidante of the President.
Only a few Attorneys General could seriously have claimed to be quali-
fied to serve as Solicitor General. The same is doubtless true of most
members of the White House staff, and no President since William How-
ard Taft even pretended to be a serious lawyer.
On any given legal issue, as is discussed at greater length below,
there may well be more than one plausible position which the govern-
ment could take, and the choice among those alternatives might legiti-
mately be influenced by administration policy. But not every conceivable
legal argument falls within this range; some are simply too strained, or
too inconsistent with unquestioned law or undisputed facts, to be taken
seriously. At times it simply is not possible to craft with intellectual in-
tegrity any basis for a desired conclusion, however earnestly that result
may be sought. Not every conceivable legal contention is equally plausi-
ble, or plausible at all; implicit in the statutory requirement that the So-
licitor General be "learned in the law"97 is a recognition that the law is
an intellectual system with specific rules, principles and limitations to be
learned and respected. In the past Solicitors General have properly re-
garded themselves as obligated to assure that briefs filed by the United
States did not contain arguments that were "absurd,"98 "unsound,"99
"completely untenable,"" ° or without a "substantial basis." 10 1
The Solicitor General is always under some pressure to expand his
or her view of the limits of plausibility. The Solicitor General's reputa-
tion with the Court for advancing only reasonable arguments gives his or
her contentions a special credibility. In any individual case, however,
that reputation would give a certain patina of reasonableness to an argu-
ment that might seem far-fetched if advanced by any other lawyer. Indi-
vidual agencies, anxious to advance whatever legal contentions would be
most favorable to their particular programs, practices, or prerogatives,
are understandably less concerned than the Solicitor General about the
possibility that their arguments, although possibly successful in the case
at hand, might in the long term undermine the Solicitor General's credi-
bility with the Court. A Solicitor General who resists the efforts of a
given agency to make some expansive but dubious argument is imposing
97. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (1982).
98. Stem II, supra note 10, at 762.
99. Cox, supra note 10, at 225.
100. Sobeloff II, supra note 10, at 157.
101. Perlman, supra note 10, at 274.
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on the agency, not his or her views of what the law is, but his or her
views about how to maximize the ability of the Solicitor General's office
to represent a large number of federal agencies over an extended period
of time. In such situations, Justice Brandeis observed, "'[t]he Solicitor
General should be a general.' "12 At times the defense of a vital policy,
or the presentation of a novel doctrine, may require the making of argu-
ments more innovative or novel than would be thought wise in an ordi-
nary case; but the government has only so much institutional capital to
spend on such arguments, and the Solicitor General is responsible for
keeping the books.
Efforts to persuade the Solicitor General to make implausible argu-
ments are not new; in 1950, for example, the ICC unsuccessfully urged
the Solicitor General to argue that the Commission could direct the seg-
regation of blacks in railroad dining cars.10 3 What was different under
the Reagan Administration, in part, was that the pressures on the Solici-
tor General evidently came from, or were made in the name of, the
White House. In Wallace v. Jaffree,'° for example, members of the ad-
ministration asked the Solicitor General to authorize the filing of a brief
arguing that a district judge could disregard longstanding Supreme Court
establishment clause decisions simply because those decisions were, in
the view of the judge and some administration members, incorrect. Pro-
fessor Bator, who served in the Solicitor General's office during this era,
reported: "We were being urged to do this because the President had
said the same in speeches and otherwise that it was his policy to restore
prayer in the public schools." ' An anonymous lawyer in the Solicitor
General's office, discussing problems later in the administration, com-
plained "we've been asked to do a lot of ridiculous things, take indefen-
sible positions and do it because it's the agenda of these ideologues.' 106
There has also been, in recent years, less acceptance of the very no-
tion that there are any limits on what legal arguments are plausible, or
that the Solicitor General has a mandate to enforce those limits. In 1984,
the Wall Street Journal reported that both Solicitor General Lee and
Professor Bator were criticized by administration conservatives for being
"too lawyerly and insufficiently political in [their] thinking."'0 7 A right
wing journal in that year denounced Lee's reliance on Supreme Court
102. Lewis, supra note 73, at 29.
103. Stem II, supra note 10, at 761-62 (citing Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816
(1950); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142 (1950)).
104. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
105. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 100.
106. Office Politicized, supra note 10.
107. Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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precedents as "servile" and "slavish."1 8 Conservatives both inside and
outside the Reagan Administration seem at times to have been unable to
comprehend that lawyers in the Solicitor General's office might resist
making a particular argument, not because they objected to the social or
political consequences of prevailing, but because they thought the argu-
ments so hare-brained that they would lose the case at issue and imperil
others as well. Having insisted for decades that Supreme Court decisions
with which they disagreed were mere policy making by unelected judges,
some conservative legal theorists may have lost the capacity to recognize
that a legal view to which they objected could possibly be anything other
than more social policy masquerading as law. It was as if constitutional
controversies had become a form of total war, in which legal principles
were not permitted to be neutral, but were required either to enlist on
one side or be deemed enemy aliens. A lawyer-to use the term
loosely-who was convinced that sound legal analysis always led to con-
servative results, and that legal argument which supported an undesir-
able liberal result was certain to be incorrect and probably disingenuous,
would lose the ability to distinguish between plausible and off-the-wall
conservative arguments, and would naturally come to doubt the good
faith of anyone who questioned the reasonableness of his or her
contentions.
Conservative critics of Rex Lee's purported failure to aggressively
pursue the President's social policies also failed to understand that the
Solicitor General's office, like the Supreme Court itself, is in many ways a
passive institution, one whose ability to influence the law is restricted by
the nature of the cases which other parties bring before it, and by respect
for the laws, rules and precedents which control how and when those
cases are to be decided. Even if the Solicitor General were willing to
disregard the normal rules of civil procedure and Supreme Court practice
in his or her haste to achieve a given result, it is unlikely that the Court
would be prepared to do so. The principles of sound lawyering restrict
the Solicitor General's ability to pursue an administration's legal agenda,
no matter how great his or her desire to do so. A Solicitor General who
ignores those constraints does so at his or her peril.
Both Lee and his successor, Charles Fried, were also criticized from
other quarters for allegedly having done precisely what conservatives
complained they had failed to do. In 1982, the New York Times de-
nounced in unusually harsh language an amicus brief filed by Solicitor
General Lee defending the abortion restrictions at issue in City of Akron
108. McClellan, supra note 21, at 3, 4.
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v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.10 9
The Reagan Justice Department filed a curious document
with the Supreme Court last week in connection with pending
abortion cases. Though called a brief for the United States as a
friend of the court, it is in fact a 20-page lecture....
We trust that the Court, which needs no such lecture, will
ignore this political tract, for it is of scant help in deciding the
complex cases to be heard in the fall term. The brief is better
suited to the partisan purposes of an Administration eager to
appease its disgruntled right wing. A Justice Department offi-
cial demonstrated as much when he made sure that a Washing-
ton conference of abortion opponents was promptly notified of
the filing.
Still, even if the document persuades no justice, it does
harm. One way is by trashing the department's reputation as a
source of principled counsel to the Court.110
Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice,"' on the other hand, suggests that
Lee made a more determined and successful effort than did Fried to
avoid advancing off-the-wall arguments framed largely to appease the far
right.
This Article argues elsewhere that a number of criticisms of Lee and
Fried, voiced by Caplan and others, are unwarranted or miscast, and it
may well be that certain controversial positions were taken over their
objections. But whatever the purpose and process involved, some of the
briefs filed in the last six years do contain arguments that exceeded the
limits of legal plausibility, and that predictably carried no votes on the
Court. The difficulty with the Akron brief was not, as the Times sug-
gested,"I2 that it defended the specific abortion restrictions there at issue;
three members of the Court ultimately concluded that those restrictions
were consistent with Roe v. Wade." 3 But the government's amicus brief
did not advance an orthodox legal argument that Roe permitted imposi-
tion of the Akron restrictions, but instead urged the Court to hold that it
was primarily for the state legislatures, not the federal judges, to inter-
pret and apply the decision in Roe." 4 That contention was neither based
109. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
110. N.Y. Times, supra note 5.
111. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9.
112. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1982, at A22, col. 1 (Mr. Lee "insists that the Court defer even to
the most burdensome restrictions").
113. Akron, 462 U.S. at 452 (O'Connor, White, & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, 8, City of
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on nor limited to any problem peculiar to abortion cases, but was
grounded on a sweeping attack on the very principle of judicial review.
Where, as is commonly the case, the resolution of a constitutional claim
would involve weighing two or more competing interests, the brief ar-
gued that the choices were fundamentally "policy issues" which elected
legislators were better equipped to make.11 Judicial review in such
cases, the argument continued, was not only unwise but a threat to de-
mocracy itself.1"6 At the oral argument, Justice Blackmun, noting that
the brief appeared to call for the overruling of Marbury v. Madison,
1 17
asked Lee with incredulity: "Did you write this brief personally?" '118
Similar difficulties were to be found in the government's amicus
brief in Thornburg v. Gingles,'1 9 the first case to come before the Court
regarding the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. 2° The fact
that the brief disagreed with the interpretation of the law taken by civil
rights groups, and with the decision of the trial court, was not per se
unreasonable; the Court itself was divided about the exact meaning of the
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Nos. 81-746 & 81-
1623):
The Court should declare that the governing standard is whether the state regulation
at issue unduly burdens the abortion decision, and that in deciding on a case to case
basis whether the burden is permissible or impermissible, courts should give heavy
deference to the state legislative judgment. ... In the future the effect will be to
channel further refinements of abortion law largely into the stream of state legislative
authority.
Id at 20.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at 15 n.11:
[Tihe exercise of [the judiciary's power of review], even when unavoidable, is always
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes
from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors .... The tendency of a common and easy resort to
this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of
the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
Id. (quoting J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901)).
117. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
118. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1982, at B4, col. 2-3:
"Are you asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled?", Associate Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, the author of the landmark decision, asked Mr. Lee.
"No, I am not," the Government's chief Supreme Court advocate replied.
"It seems to me," Justice Blackmun said in a near whisper, "that your brief asks
either that or the overruling of Marbury v. Madison." ...
No, Mr. Lee replied, he was not making such a radical request, because "at the
end of the day, the ultimate decision is still for the courts[.]"
Holding the Government's brief in the air Justice Blackmun glared down at the
Solicitor General. "Did you write this brief personally?" he asked.
"Very substantial parts of it," Mr. Lee replied.
119. 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
120. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, P.L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982).
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statute, and voted to vacate part of the order appealed from. But in de-
fending its own view of section 2, the government argued that the reports
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, which had written the
law, were not the best guide to the intent of Congress, denigrating the
Senate report in particular as the work of a mere "faction." 121 This con-
tention was based on assertions that the House bill faced defeat in the
Senate because the Senate was "deadlocked," and that the Senate lan-
guage was intended to alter the meaning of the House bill; both of these
assertions were simply incorrect.'2 2 The Solicitor General also urged the
Court to defer to President Reagan's interpretation of section 2, arguing
that his "support" "ensured its passage"; 123 in fact, however, the Reagan
Administration, and the President personally, actively opposed the lan-
guage of section 2 until Senator Dole warned publicly that he had the
121. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8 n. 12, Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986) (No. 83-1968) [hereinafter Gingles Briefl. The govern-
ment repeatedly relied on the views of Senator Hatch, one of the few opponents of the
legislation. See id. at 10 nn.18 & 19, 13 n.27, 17 n.39. The brief also cited other Senate oppo-
nents of the legislation, particularly Senator Grassly. Id. at 9-17.
122. The brief described the language of the Dole amendment, which was adopted by the
Senate Committee, as having been necessary "[t]o break the deadlock." Id. at 12. Even before
the time the amendment was offered, the original bill was already supported by 61 Senate
sponsors. Voting Rights Act Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate
Judiciary Comm. on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and H.R. 3112: Bills to Amend the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., (vol. 2-app.) at 4, 30, 157 (1983) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings]. Senator Hatch had agreed to report the bill to the floor even if the Committee
adopted the amendment to section 2 to which he objected, Senate Hearings, supra, at 69, say-
ing passage of the bill had been certain "for many months."
The Solicitor General argued that "the most significant feature" of the Dole amendment
was intended to "modify and expand" certain limitations written into the House bill. Gingles
Brief, supra note 121, at 12. Supporters of the Senate bill insisted it was in substance the same
as the House approved measure. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 179; Senate Hearings, supra, at 60, 61, 68; 128
CONG. REc. S6960-61 (daily ed. June 17, 1982) (statement of Sen. Dole); 128 CONG. REC.
H3840 (daily ed. June 23, 1982) (statement of Rep. Edwads). Senator Hatch agreed, com-
plaining, "The proposed compromise is not a compromise at all, in my opinion. The impact of
the proposed compromise is not likely to be one wit different than the unamended House
measure .... ." Senate Hearings, supra, at 70.
In an amicus brief in a related case, City Council v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985), the
Solicitor General asserted that Senator Hatch "supported the compromise adopted by Con-
gress." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, at 16 n.15, City
Council of Chicago v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985) (No. 84-627). In fact Hatch voted
against section 2 in committee, Senate Hearings, supra, at 85-86, and sought to have it re-
moved on the floor, 128 CONG. Ruc. S6965 (daily ed. June 17, 1982).
The Supreme Court rejected the Solicitor General's suggestion that it give little weight to
the Senate Committee report. Thornburg v. Gingles, 106 S. Ct. at 2762 n.7.
123. Gingles Brief, supra note 121, at 12 (Dole offered amendment "with the backing of the
President"). In an earlier amicus brief, urging the Court to note probable jurisdiction, the
Solicitor General asserted Mr. Reagan's "support for the compromise ensured its passage."
Gingles Brief, supra note 121, at 8 n.6.
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votes necessary to override a veto.124 It might be understandable if a
draft with arguments of this sort had been written by Assistant Attorney
General Reynolds, since he had led the administration's opposition to
section 2, and might well have wanted to reverse in the Supreme Court
the defeat he had suffered in the halls of Congress. But it was the Solici-
tor General's responsibility to excise from the brief overreaching argu-
ments that could not fairly be squared with the legislative history of the
statute, and that clearly did not occur.
Problems of this sort may have stemmed in part from the desire of
administration conservatives to have a Solicitor General who was in en-
thusiastic agreement with their legal and social views. Solicitor General
Fried, responding to assertions that he had taken particular positions at
the direction of the Attorney General or others, insisted that such orders
had not been given and would have served no purpose, since he was even
more conservative than his supervisors and colleagues at the Justice De-
partment. 125 One would expect any Solicitor General to be comfortable
with the policies of the administration in which he or she serves, but
undue enthusiasm for those programs can interfere with the Solicitor
General's responsibility to ensure that policy-related briefs do not, out of
excessive zeal, transgress the limits of plausible argument. The 1977
OLC Memorandum argued that the Attorney General and President
ought not personally frame the government's position in Supreme Court
cases because "extensive involvement in policy matters ... might, on
occasion, cloud a clear vision of what the law requires."1 26 The vision of
a Solicitor General can become clouded in the same way.
While Solicitor General Lee's brief in Akron provoked some harsh
words from the New York Times and at oral argument, a minor firestorm
of controversy was triggered by a brief filed three years later by Solicitor
General Fried in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians,127 in
which Fried argued, inter alia, that Roe v. Wade should be overruled.
Justice Blackmun characterized the Thornburgh brief as "very amaz-
ing,,,128 a phrase evidently not intended as a term of approbation. Pro-
124. Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 763 (Reagan opposed to section 2); Voting Rights
Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975,
S. 1992, and H.R. 3112: Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-
97 (vol. 1) (1983). (Justice Department opposed to section 2); L.A. Times, May 4, 1982, at Al,
col. 3 (Dole warning of sufficient votes to override veto); Wall St. J., May 4, 1982, at 8, col. 2
(same); N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, at B7, col. 4 (Reagan opposed to section 2).
125. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 150.
126. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 232.
127. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
128. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 143 (citing Rex Lee, draft of History of the Office of the
Solicitor General, at 32-34).
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fessor Tribe denounced Fried's brief as "unprincipled... divisive, and
... dangerous."12 9 Eighty-one members of Congress joined in a brief
deploring Fried's action as "extraordinary and unprecedented." '
Caplan devotes a full chapter of The Tenth Justice to the brief.'
31
The Thornburgh controversy is particularly important because it
served to highlight two basic disputes between Solicitor General Lee and
his conservative critics. The most detailed conservative criticism of Lee,
printed in a 1984 issue of Benchmark, denounced the Solicitor General
precisely because he had failed to urge the Supreme Court to overturn
any of the numerous decisions to which the right wing, and to some de-
gree the President, objected:
The fourth year of the Reagan Presidency is almost history.
... But during the past four years, the Supreme Court has
not overruled a single Warren Court decision .....
... [One reason is that] Solicitor General Rex Lee has not
urged the Supreme Court to overrule a single prior decision,
including Roe v. Wade, the New York Prayer case, and Mapp v.
Ohio.132
... Lee has won most of his cases since he took office ....
[T]hese personal triumphs for Rex Lee... are, in large mea-
sure, defeats for President Reagan; for these decisions being de-
livered by the Burger Court, not one of which overturns a prior
ruling, have the effect of preserving intact existing case law and
the underlying doctrinal assumptions that brought us the con-
stitutional revolution begun under Franklin Roosevelt.
133
The article argued that Lee's brief in Akron, precisely because it had
failed to repudiate the Court's prior abortion decisions, was a "qualified
endorsement of the Roe rationale .... "134 The Solicitor General, it
129. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood Conference 3, 17 (Sept. 3, 1985)).
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Senator Bob Packwood at 3, Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 & 84-1379) [hereinafter Packwood
Brief]. "For the first time in the history of the Solicitor General's office, in a case in which the
United States is not even a party, and a case in which the issue was not presented by the
parties, the Department of Justice has urged the repudiation of a liberty long since declared
fundamental by this Court." Id.
131. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 135-54.
132. McClellan, supra note 21, at 1-2.
133. Id. at 14.
134. Id. at 4.
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urged, ought to adopt a strategy of "confronting the Justices with princi-
pled arguments, challenging them to defend the rationale of their opin-
ions, and demanding reversal of liberal precedents .... 135
Solicitor General Lee, on the other hand, regarded even the indirect
questioning of Roe in his Akron brief as having been a tactical error.
136
In a subsequent letter Lee argued:
I do not believe that the Court should never be urged to reverse
past precedent. Indeed, it is all right to urge that cases be over-
ruled, but there is a large cost in doing so, particularly if you
know-and the Court knows that you know-that there is no
chance for overruling in that particular case.
137
Caplan attributes to Lee a considerably more restricted view of the role
of the Solicitor General, quoting from the draft of a speech prepared by
Lee prior to the Thornburgh brief.
"Let me give you the practical reasons why I don't think the
Solicitor General can or should take it upon himself to tell the
Supreme Court what he may very well believe are its errors of
constitutional doctrine.
... No lawyer worth his salt would think of going before
the Supreme Court... and telling its members point blank that
they were wrong on some case they decided just several years
before, even if the lawyer strongly believes they were. That ap-
proach would simply not be in his client's best interest, and the
reason is obvious: the Court as an institution would find it of-
fensive. In a close case-as so many of the cases are in the
Supreme Court-the lawyer's impertinence might well cost the
client the one or two votes needed to win. It would therefore be
both a tactical mistake and a professional violation of the law-
yer's ethical duty to advance his client's cause. But more than
that, it would deeply injure the Solicitor General's personal
credibility with the Court ....
And so my practical argument against those who would
have the Solicitor General rail against the perceived excesses
and errors of the Supreme Court is simply that it would be bad
lawyering, period .... In his speeches, in his writings, or, in
later life, in the classroom ... the Solicitor General has the
135. Id. at 14.
136. Wash. Post, July 7, 1986, at A7, col. 1.
137. Letter from Rex E. Lee to Julius L. Chambers (Mar. 23, 1988) (on file at Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Office).
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right... to speak his mind on the issues, and to say where he
thinks the law... should be going. He has no business doing
so as an advocate, however .... 138
Lee chose, however, not to deliver the speech at issue in this form, and
the passage quoted by Caplan does not appear to reflect Lee's final view
of this matter. Professor Meador opposes frontal attacks on existing de-
cisions, arguing that "'[p]recedents are chipped away, not just
tumbled.' ,139
The overruling of a reigning precedent is not an act so obnoxious to
the Court that no sensible lawyer would dare speak its name, or seek to
achieve it save by a coy process of indirect intellectual seduction. The
Supreme Court regularly overturns its prior decisions, sometimes grant-
ing certiorari to consider that very action, sometimes asking the parties
on its own initiative to discuss that possibility, sometimes acting sua
sponte. No member of the Court who had written opinions overruling
prior decisions, or who had seen his or her own handiwork overturned,
could fairly take offense merely because an attorney suggested that a past
opinion was incorrect. Since members of the Court frequently urge that
previous decisions be overruled, it is hard to see why they would object if
a lawyer advanced a similar contention. The Court could not adequately
evaluate the advisability of overruling a precedent if counsel were inhib-
ited from discussing the wisdom of doing so, and there seems no reason
to forbid the Solicitor General to sit out the debate on a controversial
precedent until the outcome of that controversy is a foregone conclusion.
Nor is it the case, as Meador suggests, that precedents are undone only
by a process of erosion; some are altered by avulsion when an argument
demonstrates persuasively that an earlier case was based on inadequate
research, or had proved unworkable. Where the Solicitor General, or the
Administration in which he serves, disagrees with a particular precedent,
both the Court and the Solicitor General's credibility would certainly be
better served by a candid acknowledgement of that disagreement than by
an attempt to misrepresent the holding or implications of the disputed
decision. It is not unheard of, although admittedly uncommon, for an
amicus to urge the Court to overrule a decision which none of the parties
had attacked; an amicus brief in Welch v. State Department of Highways
and Public Transportation 1' took precisely that approach, arguing that
the Court should overrule Hans v. Louisiana,141 without visibly offending
138. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 144-45 (quoting draft speech of Rex Lee).
139. Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 1.
140. 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2957-58 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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any member of the Court.
Solicitor General Lee also disagrees with his critics, and perhaps
with his successor, regarding the propriety of advancing in the Supreme
Court an argument which is unlikely in the short term to command the
support of five justices. Benchmark asserted that it would be wrong for a
Solicitor General to deliberately avoid arguing for an important legal
principle merely because he believed the Court would rule against him:
By seeking short-term litigation gains, we thus sacrifice en-
during truths .... This is a struggle for men's minds, a war of
ideas and jurisprudential values, that can never come to pass
unless these ideas are publicly articulated, debated, and dis-
cussed at the highest levels of state. There must be frequent
recourse to sound political and legal principles, if they are to
prevail in the Courts .... 142
Solicitor General Lee, however, has insisted that the government should
be exceedingly reluctant to advance arguments unlikely to be "accepted
by a majority of the Court."
This is not to say that it is never advisable for a Solicitor Gen-
eral to take a position that he knows the Court will reject.
There could be long-term objectives to be served by such a fil-
ing. All I am saying is that there are large costs, and it is rarely
advisable. In my four years I never did it .... 14
Lee believed that his tentative foray in the Akron brief had proved
counterproductive because it had led to a reaffirmation of Roe. "'A ma-
jor factor to be taken into account is whether you can win. There are
major costs to a loss in the Supreme Court, and the principal one is you
may strengthen the precedent against you. We paid a price.' "4 Solici-
tor General Fried, on the other hand, has defended his more aggressive
record by explaining that his aim was not solely to win cases in the short
term, but also to influence the Court's long term direction. 145
The correct approach probably lies somewhere in between. The
Supreme Court would be unlikely to take offense if the Solicitor General,
in a straightforward and judicious manner, submitted a brief staking out
a position which both the Solicitor General and the Court knew would
142. McClellan, supra note 21, at 14.
143. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 146.
144. Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at A8, col. 1. See also Wash. Post, July 7, 1986, at A7, col. 1;
Office Politicized, supra note 10.
145. Wash. Post, July 7, 1986, at A7, col. 1 (Fried's aim "is not solely to win cases in the
short run but rather to exert a long-term influence on the court's direction in a broad range of
areas").
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not for the time being command five votes. The Justices themselves do
precisely that scores of times each year; the very purpose of a dissent is to
articulate a minority view in the hope that it will eventually prevail. It
might seem a bit presumptuous for an ordinary lawyer to take such a
long term perspective, in part because neither ordinary lawyers nor ordi-
nary clients are likely to return to the Court to pursue an issue further,
but the Solicitor General and his client have the sort of ongoing relation-
ship with the Court and the development of the law that make such a
perspective entirely appropriate. A brief which questions reigning prece-
dent may not be helpful to the majority which accepts that precedent in
resolving the case immediately at hand, but might nonetheless contribute
to a larger debate which took place over the course of several years and a
number of decisions. An unsuccessful assault on an existing precedent
will not necessarily add to the strength of the precedent. The decision in
Akron would undoubtedly have involved a reapplication, and at least an
implicit reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade, regardless of what position Lee
had taken in that case.
It would be unfortunate indeed if liberals unhappy with briefs filed
by Lee or Fried, or concerned about how the Solicitor General might act
under future Republican administrations, were now to espouse the view
that the government should never criticize an existing precedent or ad-
vance an argument that could only prevail in the long term. Such an
approach would have been utterly disastrous during the administration
of Franklin Roosevelt. Today there are reigning Supreme Court prece-
dents which liberals might want to overrule as much as conservatives
would like to overturn Roe v. Wade. The decision in Maher v. Roe,146 for
example, upholding the denial of Medicare funds for abortions, poses a
major problem for women in many states, and McClesky v. Kemp 147 has
sanctioned a degree of racial discrimination in the administration of the
death penalty. No one can foresee whether future Solicitors General will
be liberal or conservative, but stifling the voice of the Solicitor General is
surely not an appropriate method for influencing the development of the
law.
That is not to say that the Thornburgh brief was a masterpiece of
appellate advocacy. But surely Justice Blackmun did not characterize
the brief as "amazing" merely because it disagreed with Roe; most of the
adult population in the United States knew that the Reagan administra-
tion disagreed with Roe, and it could hardly have come as a surprise to
the Court when the administration said so in a brief. But having under-
146. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
147. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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taken the delicate task of criticizing a line of decisions which the govern-
ment surely knew a majority of the Court supported, the brief proceeded
in a notably injudicious manner. The brief attacked the decisions of the
lower courts in harsh language which, while probably inappropriate in
any government brief, was particularly provocative because it smacked of
the strident rhetoric of the anti-abortion movement.14 The brief also
contained a section which argued that, even if Roe was correct, Akron
had been wrongly decided.149 At the time the Thornburgh brief was filed,
the Akron decision was only twenty-five months old. It is easy to under-
stand that the Court might have been provoked by a request that it over-
rule a decision which the government had lost barely two years before;
that proposal was less a principled stand on a matter of ongoing impor-
tance than a disgruntled and out-of-time petition for rehearing. Some
parts of the criticism of Roe itself were traditional and lawyerly.15s The
argument avoided the particularly rigid concept of original intent then
popular in some administration circles, and expressly distinguished Roe
v. Wade from other earlier privacy cases, which it did not challenge. 51
But the brief did not stop at arguing that Roe had been incorrectly de-
cided; it went on to describe the reasoning of that decision as "dis-
turbing," "difficult to grasp" and "particularly ill-founded,"1"2 and in
five different passages characterized the holding of Roe as "arbitrary." '153
The majority opinion in Roe was said to "leap to its conclusion,"1 5 4 and
to exemplify an approach which rendered "constitutional adjudication
... a picnic to which the framers bring the words and the judges the
148. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2, Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495 & 84-1379); id.
at 2 (lower courts' "manifest eagerness to strike down the state statutes in question .... ;"
decisions "harsh and one-sided"); id. at 3 (lower court opinions "betrayed unabashed hostility
to state regulation of abortion and ill-disguised suspicion of state legislators' motives"); id. at 4
(Third Circuit "antipathy" to state regulation of abortion; demonstrated "zeal to place the
worst possible construction upon the... statute.. ."); id. at 5 (Third Circuit decision "unprec-
edented and remarkable"); id. at 7 ("[t]he courts' approach is unjustifiable and can only be
explained as an attempt to censor printed matter the majority did not like"); id. at 10 (Third
Circuit opinion "far-fetched;" Seventh Circuit decision "ignores elementary principles of juris-
diction, comity and federalism in its relentless determination to invalidate the challenged pro-
visions at all costs"); Id. at 11 ("court's reasoning... remarkable"); id. at 12 (decision "had
absolutely no basis"); id. at 15 (reasoning "strained"); id. at 16 ("[t]he approach of the courts
below betrays in our view an extreme and unseemly hostility to legitimate state regulation of
abortion").
149. Id. at 16-20.
150. Id. at 25-27.
151. Id. at 28-29 and nn.7 & 8.
152. Id. at 22, 23, 25.
153. Id. at 21-23.
154. Id. at 27.
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meaning." '55 This simply is not the sort of language that a sensible law-
yer would use in a brief intended for the eyes of six justices who had
either signed or subscribed to the decision under attack.
It is also important to bear in mind the enormous difference between
an isolated, considered decision to disagree, in the hope of long term
change, with a specific reigning precedent, and a practice of simply tak-
ing whatever position the Solicitor General thinks would be wise or sensi-
ble regardless of whether it can be squared with the relevant precedent.
Solicitor General Fried asserted in 1986:
I think there's something condescending about only saying
things which, on some kind of nose-counting prognostication,
the court is going to adopt .... I think it is less political, not
more political, it is more scholarly, not less scholarly, it is less
manipulative, not more manipulative, to speak to the logic of
the case as we see it.1
5 6
One would expect a nonpolitical, nonmanipulative academic to speak to
the logic of each issue as he or she saw it, but the Solicitor General's job
is to practice.law-albeit at times with a long term perspective-not to
make candid intellectual pronouncements. Save in exceptional circum-
stances, the Solicitor General, like any litigator, has to operate within the
confines of the legal principles accepted by the Court in which he prac-
tices, not because to do so is more or less political, manipulative or schol-
arly, but because his job is to "conduct and argue suits and appeals in the
Supreme Court," '57 to speak, not to the White House, to the academic
community, or to some interest group, but to the Court. The six and
one-eighth by nine and one-fourth inch sand gray booklets printed for
the Solicitor General by the Government Printing Office are not intended
as a private law review of unusually limited albeit prestigious circulation.
If the Solicitor General lacks the ability to distinguish between what the
Supreme Court will regard as arguable and implausible, or the Solicitor
General lacks the inclination or will to heed those distinctions, the docu-
ments that result may be clever, well written, and witty, but they will not
be briefs.
Perhaps because many of the more controversial positions taken by
Solicitors General Lee and Fried were in amicus briefs, rather than in
cases in which the government was a party, a number of critics have
suggested that the Solicitor General ought only to file amicus briefs when
the United States might in some way be materially affected by the out-
155. Id. at 24.
156. Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1986, at As, col. 1 (emphasis in original).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (1982).
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come of a case. Commenting on the Akron brief, the New York Times
objected that "[i]n this case, where there is no Federal interest, the Jus-
tice Department rushes in to assert one."1 8 One unnamed former mem-
ber of the Solicitor General's office, deploring a brief filed by Fried
regarding the right of a school board to suspend a student for giving an
"indecent" speech, objected, "I don't see the running of schools as the
business of the federal government."1"9 Another member of the office
accused Fried of a willingness to file an amicus brief on the thinnest,
"'threadbare,'" claim of federal interest."6 Caplan suggests that in the
past amicus briefs had only been submitted if a case had an impact on the
government's "'more direct interests.'"161 Congressional Quarterly
characterized the Reagan Administration as "bombarding the court with
• . . briefs . . . in cases that do not directly involve the federal
government."
162
Both Lee and Fried took issue with the suggestion that amicus briefs
should be limited to cases that might, at least conceivably, affect the fed-
eral government itself. Lee argued that, in addition to such cases, amicus
briefs were also appropriate when the questions before the Court "do not
involve any direct responsibility of the United States to enforce the law
but concern some issue that is part of the president's program." 163 Fried
insisted,
There are cases where what is at stake is not some particular
government program but an important and pervasive view of
the law or the Constitution. Here we must be particularly in-
frequent and rare in making a contribution, but historically this
office has always spoken on such matters. We have never con-
fined ourselves to filing only in cases where some distinct gov-
ernment program was affected. 164
Historical practice squarely supports the position taken by Lee and
Fried. When the Solicitor General fied a brief in Shelley v. Kraemer,
165
158. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1982, at A22, col. 1; see also id. at cols. 1-2 ("[r]arely has a
Solicitor General intervened in a Supreme Court case without clearly identifying a strong Fed-
eral interest. But Mr. Lee concedes that Federal law is not implicated in the local abortion
rules in the pending cases. The Government's concern, he says, is 'in preserving the proper
sphere of legislative action.' That's just another way of saying to the Court: get out.").
159. Office Politicized, supra note 10.
160. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 199.
161. Id. at 197.
162. Witt, Reagan Crusade Before Court Unprecedented in Intensity, 44 CONG. Q. 616
(1986).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 616; see also L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 196.
165. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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he explained that he had chosen to do so simply because "'[t]he Federal
Government has a special responsibility for the protection of the funda-
mental civil rights guaranteed to the people by the Constitution and laws
of the United States.' "166 Solicitor General Perlman commented that
the government filed an amicus brief in a subsequent case
[a]lthough the Government had no direct interest in the partic-
ular litigation [because] we were interested in sustaining what
we deemed to be a salutory removal of an unfair discrimination
against the citizens of the District of Columbia who had there-
tofore been denied the same access to the impartial federal judi-
ciary as was available to citizens of the states proper. 67
Between 1950 and 1970 the Solicitor General filed a large number of
amicus briefs in cases involving the one-person one-vote requirement, 6 '
sit-in demonstrations169 and racial discrimination,170 and in a series of
school integration cases both before and after Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.1 71 Solicitors General under both Democratic and Republican presi-
dents have maintained that the manner in which state and local schools
166. Quoted in Perlman, supra note 10, at 284. The text of the amicus brief was reprinted
by Public Affairs Press, as a book, albeit a book without any notice or claim of copyright.
PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY: AN HISTORIC BRIEF AGAINST RACIAL CovENANTs (1948). An
introduction to the book, written by Wesley McCune, observed:
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the legal cases which moved the Justice
Department to prepare this brief.... The mere fact that the Justice Department filed
this brief with the Supreme Court, even though the federal government is not a party
to the covenant cases submitted to that tribunal, illustrates that some progress is
being made toward letting the people in on the law ....
Something must be done to make legal documents more easily available. As
things now stand, such documents are beyond the reach of the average library, let
alone the average person. Were it not for the public service of the publisher of"Prej-
udice and Property," this brief, for example, would probably be gathering dust in the
ifies of a dozen lawyers and judges.
The situation is particularly serious in connection with those cases in which the
Justice Department submits a brief amicus curiae, as 'friend of the court,' which it is
doing more frequently. Filings of such a brief recognizes the public interest in the
case, yet the public doesn't really get in on it.
Id. at 6-7. By a happy coincidence, the publisher referred to in this passage is the father of the
author of this Article.
167. Id. at 281.
168. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967);
Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
169. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153
(1964); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964). See also Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (free speech).
170. Reitmen v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 454 (1967); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963)
(parks); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (restaurants in publicly
owned building); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (bus terminal).
171. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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were run was very much a legitimate concern of the federal government,
at least to the extent that those schools were being run on a racially seg-
regated basis.172
Caplan suggests that under the standards articulated by Solicitor
General Cox, amicus briefs would be limited to cases somehow directly
affecting federal activities. 173 On a closer reading, however, the Cox
speech to which Caplan refers describes the existence of such an interest
as tending to support the filing of a brief, but not as a necessity:
It is difficult, perhaps it is impossible, to work out any very
clear standards for determining when the government should
participate amicus curiae. One consideration is importance of
the question in the development of the law: Is it a basic consti-
tutional question or just an ordinary question of law with no
widespread significance. Is a large number of people affected?
Whether the case will have any impact on the govern-
ment's more direct interests is certainly an important test....
The fourth standard... is... "Can we help the Court by
taking part?" Frequently the private parties take rather ex-
treme positions; this is true of the sit-in cases. And with some-
one in there, briefing and arguing an intermediate view, a view
which perhaps would lead to some cases going one-way and
some another, the Court may achieve a sounder result than if
only the parties were present.1
74
These variois factors are, in Cox's terms, distinct "considerations"
which would bear on a decision, not, as Caplan seems to suggest, "re-
quirements." Caplan argues that in Baker v. Carr7 ' and Reynolds v.
Sims, 176 in which Cox filed amicus briefs, "the federal government would
be directly affected by the outcome of the cases" because "[w]hat the
Supreme Court decided about the apportionment of state legislatures
would apply to Congress as well .... 1177 But following Baker and Reyn-
olds the Solicitor General's office filed briefs regarding whether the prin-
ciple of one-person one-vote should be extended to the election of school
172. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Briefs filed in school cases after Brown, but prior to the
adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, included Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Goss
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
173. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 197.
174. Cox, supra note 10, at 226-27.
175. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
176. 379 U.S. 870 (1963).
177. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 197.
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boards, to local political subdivisions, or to residency districts used in at-
large elections, issues of no relevance to congressional districting.
178
The Solicitor General's suggestion in Shelley that the United States
had an interest simply in the vindication of fundamental legal and consti-
tutional17 9 rights is more consistent with the traditional role of the Solici-
tor General's office than the more crabbed and cabined standard recently
suggested. When the government does file a brief in the Supreme Court,
it has generally been regarded both by the Solicitor General's staff and by
the Court itself as obligated to look beyond the narrow and direct inter-
ests of the executive branch and to consider what result will further the
public welfare and promote the orderly development of the law. It would
be incongruous if the Solicitor General were to deliberately ignore those
broader considerations in deciding when to file amicus briefs. There may
in a very technical sense have been a theoretical federal government in-
terest in cases like Brown, Reynolds, and Shelley, since the Attorney
General has broad statutory authority to enforce criminal prohibitions
against deliberate deprivations of constitutional rights.'8 0 But the Solici-
tor General did not file briefs in these cases because the Justice Depart-
ment had any interest in or intention of prosecuting the Topeka Board of
Education, the Alabama Secretary of State, or the members of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court who issued the injunction forbidding the Shelleys
from moving into the house they had bought in St. Louis. The govern-
ment was not seeking to lay the legal foundation for some new wave of
criminal indictments, but to establish what the Truman, Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations thought were fundamental constitutional
rights.
The absence of certain types of federal interests may well militate
against the filing of an amicus brief, but it is important to understand
when and why. The existence of a purely theoretical interest-the possi-
bility, for example, that segregationist school officials might be subject to
federal prosecution-is of little or no importance. But it does matter if
178. See cases cited in supra note 168.
179. There was no noticeable objection when members of Congress filed an amicus brief in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, despite the absence of any direct federal, or
congressional, interest. The brief explained, under the heading "Interest of Amici":
As members of a co-ordinate branch of government, sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion in the face of the most intense political controversy, Amici submit this brief in
the conviction that the vision of the judicial function and of individual liberty es-
poused by the Government in these cases is radically at odds with the written Consti-
tution, with the position urged heretofore by the United States in this Court, and
with the judiciary's traditional role as a principled and independent guardian of con-
stitutional liberties.
Packwood Brief, supra note 130, at 3 (footnote omitted).
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-246 (1982).
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the disposition of a given case would in fact further, or obstruct, an ac-
tual ongoing federal program or activity which the Solicitor General
seeks to protect. In that situation the program or activity helps to shape
the position which the Solicitor General will take, and may well provide
the government with a special perspective or degree of understanding
that would be of assistance to the Court. The existence of such a direct
federal stake in the outcome of the litigation would ordinarily alleviate
any concerns the Court might have that the administration was filing a
brief merely to make a political point or to curry favor with some constit-
uent group.
When a case does not have this sort of direct impact on federal ac-
tivities, the submission of an amicus brief may be fraught with one or
more of several types of problems. First, the weight accorded by the
Court to amicus briefs filed by the government in these cases is likely to
be significantly lowered if such filings are a common occurence. Where
no direct federal interest is at stake, the Court may wonder why the So-
licitor General is filing a brief at all. If such submissions are infrequent,
and carefully selected, they may signal that the United States attaches
particular importance to the issues in question, and provide a degree of
political support, in the broadest sense, for the result urged by the Solici-
tor General; if the submissions are frequent, or the issues seem minor, the
Court may suspect the Solicitor General of officious intermeddling or
worse. Second, if the Solicitor General's positions are not rooted in the
advancement or protection of some federal activity, then it would be en-
tirely possible for a subsequent Solicitor General to file a brief taking a
completely inconsistent position for no reason other than a change in
personnel in the Solicitor General's office or the White House. The
Court would not ordinarily fault the Solicitor General for taking a differ-
ent position because the programs he or she was responsible for defend-
ing had changed, but the credibility of legal arguments advanced by the
Solicitor General's office would be impaired if the office's analysis of rele-
vant legal principles somehow followed the election results. Third, when
an ongoing federal program serves to shape the Solicitor General's posi-
tion, it will ordinarily be a program that has the concurrent support of
both the Congress and the executive branch. Absent such a program,
amicus briefs could at times become a vehicle by which the administra-
tion sought to resolve in the courts its policy disputes with the Congress.
Finally, the absence of such related federal programs may diminish the
likelihood that the Solicitor General will have something useful to say to
the Court. Such potential difficulties are not present in every case, and
they may be of different significance depending on whether the contem-
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plated brief would deal with the merits of a case, or with whether a grant
of certiorari was warranted, but they counsel considerable caution in
framing and filing an amicus brief not closely related to some ongoing
federal activity, and substantial care in selecting the small number of
cases in which the Solicitor General might express a view about a matter
with no operational impact on the United States government.181
If there is an argument to be made against the use of amicus briefs
by the Reagan administration, it will have to be based on a more detailed
analysis than has been offered so far. The mere fact that some of those
briefs did not involve a direct federal interest is not by itself a basis for
serious criticism. The most celebrated and controversial amicus briefs,
those concerning abortion and affirmative action, did indeed reflect the
highest domestic priorities of the White House. One may well deplore
the values of an administration which was so much more concerned
about eradicating abortion and affirmative action than it was about re-
ducing teenage pregnancies or ending racial discrimination, but it seems
unreasonable to fault Lee or Fried for not trying to base their decisions
on the very different priorities of earlier administrations.
Underlying the Solicitor General's ability to ensure that Supreme
Court cases are handled in a sound, lawyerly manner, particularly his or
her ability to prevent the filing of a brief advancing an indefensible posi-
tion or argument, is the prerogative of the Solicitor General to refuse to
sign a brief with which he or she is in serious disagreement. 182 Because
the craft of a lawyer, like that of a scientist, involves in principle a sub-
stantial degree of professional judgment and candor, a directive that a
Solicitor General sign a legal document with which he or she disagreed-
like a directive to the Surgeon General to sign a scientific analysis which
he or she thought inaccurate-would call into question the intellectual
honesty, and soundness, of the document at issue and of the office itself.
The credibility of the Solicitor General with the Supreme Court rests in
part on the assumption, generally well founded, that the Solicitor Gen-
eral would indeed withhold his or her signature from a brief which he or
she believed was clearly incorrect. In theory the Attorney General or
President could routinely determine the content of briefs, and fire any
Solicitor General who withheld his or her signature, but no lawyer worth
181. Solicitor General Griswold commented while in office: "I have been trying very hard,
but without too great success, to hold down the number of briefs amicus curiae we fie, under
the theory that the more you file the less effective they are." 1973 House Hearings, supra note
74, at 275-76.
182. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 8-12; Bork Hearings, supra note 30, at 21 ('when I
thought the law was wrong but it was the law I would sign the brief. IfI think it is not the law,
I certainly won't sign the brief.").
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having would agree to serve as Solicitor General under such circum-
stances, and no Solicitor General who did so could be very effective. Pre-
cisely because it is a relatively rare occurrence for the Solicitor General
to decline to sign a brief, such a refusal, when noted by the Court, calls
into serious question both the substance of the government brief and the
way it was prepared. The Solicitor General's inherent power to withhold
his or her signature constitutes a powerful and ever present deterrent to
efforts to override his or her decisions, for a decision by the Attorney
General or the White House to do so would almost certainly prove a
Pyrrhic victory, as it did in the Bob Jones case.
In theory a President or Attorney General might use a threat of
dismissal to try to force a Solicitor General to sign a disputed brief, but
neither appears ever to have done so,183 and with good reason. The dis-
missal of a Solicitor General under such circumstances would have, at
least within the legal community, an impact comparable to the infamous
Saturday Night Massacre--crippling the credibility of the brief the dis-
missed Solicitor General had refused to sign, and generating both enor-
mous support for the Solicitor General and stern disapproval of those
who had removed him. It is difficult to imagine a more certain manner
in which an administration could lose a case than by dismissing the Solic-
itor General for refusing to sign its brief; the Supreme Court would al-
most have to rule against the government in order to protect the
competence and candor of future Solicitors General. Since the Solicitor
General earns in that position far less than he or she could in private
practice, the possibility of dismissal would not be viewed by anyone in
that office as a financial threat. Conversely, a Solicitor General who
abandoned his or her opposition to a brief in response to such a threat,
like a miscreant who agreed to make a blackmail payment, would by
doing so induce similar threats or hints of threats in the future.
The most celebrated instance in which a Solicitor General declined
to sign a brief occurred in 1955, when Solicitor General Sobeloff withheld
his signature from the government's brief in Peters v. Hobby." 4 Sobeloff
refused to defend the practice of the federal Loyalty Review Board of
branding individuals as disloyal, and barring them from federal employ-
ment, based on information from sources whose identities were neither
disclosed to the accused individuals nor known to the Board itself.185
183. Acting Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace was reportedly threatened with dismissal
for refusing to support the administration's position in Bob Jones v. United States, 461 U.S.
571 (1983). Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1984, § 1 at 1, col. 1.
184. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
185. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 10-12.
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When Sobeloff was subsequently nominated by the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration for a vacancy on the Fourth Circuit, the nomination was opposed
by several witnesses because of his refusal to sign the Peters brief. The
president of the Virginia League objected:
Solicitor General Sobeloff refused to sign this brief of the De-
partment of Justice and would not appear for the Government
before the Supreme Court as the chief law officer of the United
States ....
We will never willingly accept as a public servant a man
who so obviously persists in his rebelliousness.186
The attorney for the Fairfax Citizens Council argued:
My clients feel that he did not do his duty as Solicitor General
.... [T]hey feel that in the Peters case he should have gone
along with the Government's position or resigned. They do not
disagree with his right to assert his own convictions, but feel
that he should have either played ball as a member of the team
or gotten off the team.1
87
Attorney General Brownell responded to this opposition by dispatching
his executive assistant to assure the Senate Judiciary Committee that
Brownell regarded Sobeloff's conduct as "in the best traditions of the
law, and at all times lawyerlike in the highest standards of the profes-
sion," and that Sobeloff's action in declining to sign the Peters brief "was
with the knowledge and consent of the Attorney General."'88
A more recent but potentially serious threat to the independence
and integrity of the Solicitor General's office arose in the spring of 1985,
following the resignation of Solicitor General Lee. Rather than nominate
a new Solicitor General, the Reagan Administration chose instead to
leave Charles Fried for several months as "Acting" Solicitor General.
This was not a temporary measure taken while the White House or At-
torney General were waiting for the FBI to complete a background in-
vestigation of Fried, or were considering other possible selections.
Rather, Fried was placed on an essentially probationary status from
May, 1985, when Lee announced his resignation, until October, 1985,
when Fried was finally nominated to serve as Solicitor General, the ap-
parent purpose of this probation being to ascertain whether Fried would
insist, as had Lee, on subordinating ideological crusades to the con-
186. Nomination of Simon R Sobeloff. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1956).
187. Id. at 62.
188. Id. at 74 (statement of John V. Lindsay).
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straints of lawyerliness. 189 The difference between serving as a Solicitor
General subject to dismissal, and as an Acting Solicitor General in hope
of permanent appointment, is of enormous importance, for while polit-
ical realities make it extraordinarily difficult to fire a Solicitor General,
the President and Attorney General are accorded essentially absolute dis-
cretion not to nominate a possible appointee. The lower level officials
and outside groups which a Solicitor General must at times anger if he is
to do his job properly, and which could not conceivably bring about the
Solicitor General's removal, might well have a decisive influence over
whether the Attorney General would select an Acting Solicitor General
for permanent appointment. One need not criticize Fried's actions dur-
ing this probationary period to recognize that the practice of appointing
an Acting Solicitor General for any extended period of time is fraught
with the same dangers as the probationary appointment of an Acting
Supreme Court Justice would be. Such an arrangement may be consider-
ably more serious than a direct effort to override a Solicitor General's
decision in a particular case, because the pressures generated operate
within the Solicitor General's office, rather than in an overt inter-office
dispute. In the future, the Senate would be well advised to intervene
promptly if any subsequent attempt is made to force an attorney to serve
a probationary period as acting Solicitor General.
V. BALANCING JUSTICE AND ADVOCACY
On the friezes and interiors of federal offices throughout the nation's
capital are carved a wide array of bromides about government service,
most of which often have little relationship to, or impact on, the activities
that take place in those buildings. Among these is an inscription on the
rotunda outside the office of the Attorney General, on the fifth floor of
the Department of Justice, which reads "The United States wins its point
whenever Justice is done its citizens in the courts."19 These words may
have limited relevance to the primarily administrative and policy-making
tasks of the Attorney General himself, and may be of no significance to
some units within the department. But for the staff of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office, that creed has by tradition been a very real and operative
premise of its work, of considerably greater day-to-day significance than
anything to be found, for example, in the Code of Federal Regulations.
The phrase itself was coined early in the century by Solicitor Gen-
eral Frederick Lehmann; since that time it has regularly been cited by
189. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 149-50.
190. See infra note 191.
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other Solicitors General 9' and by the Supreme Court itself. 92 Solicitor
General Perlman described the manner in which in his time Lehmann's
words related to the functioning activities of the Solicitor General's staff:
Although I have held office for almost two years, I am as
much impressed today as I was during... 1947... that gov-
ernment lawyers, generally, are more interested in arriving at
exact justice, with a proper consideration of the equities in-
volved, than in making a record based on a won and lost count
of cases. None of the less fortunate persons whose interests
have been involved may ever know of the time and effort and
talent expended in their behalf by lawyers they never heard of
and whose services they could not employ, but it is a fine and
great thing for those close to government procedure to know
that the word "justice" has vitality and meaning, that it is alive
and active, and that it guides our judgments and tempers our
actions. 193
For Perlman the role of the Solicitor General and his staff, quite unlike
that of private lawyers, was at times "semi-judicial" and "non-
adversary." 
194
In recent years conservatives have propounded a very different con-
ception of the Solicitor General's duties, arguing that he is essentially like
a private attorney retained to represent the President; 19 the sole measure
of a Solicitor General's success and responsibility, on this view, is the
extent to which he succeeds in winning Court decisions that advance the
social and political philosophies of whoever happens to occupy the White
191. Cox, supra note 10, at 223; Perlman, supra note 10, at 289; Sobeloff II, supra note 10,
at 148; see 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 231.
192. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
193. Perlman, supra note 10, at 279-80.
194. Id. at 280; see also Sobeloff II, supra note 10, at 148 ("Unlike the lawyer, the judge is
confined by his sense of responsibility for the symmetry of the law and by his obligation to
maintain its continuity and conformity to basic principles and traditions. The solicitor gen-
eral, too, though an advocate, must not forget that his client is the United States government,
which is dedicated to the same principles."); 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 292
("[Tihe traditions of the office, not only within the office but within the Department are that it
is-I don't want to overstate this-but that it is quasi-judicial.").
195. McClellan, supra note 21, at 2 ("As a spokesman and strategist for the Reagan Admin-
istration... Lee's performance has been less satisfactory"); Wash. Post, July 7, 1986, at A7,
col. 6 ("Fried has said he views the president as his client"); cf. Legal Times, supra note 1
(" 'You either serve your master, the attorney general, or you resign,' charges Daniel Popeo,
general counsel of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation"). This attitude led con-
servatives to criticize Solicitor General Lee for having defended the constitutionality of stat-
utes they thought were inconsistent with President Reagan's policies. See infra note 221 and
accompanying text.
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House on a given day. The contrary tradition in the Solicitor General's
office reflects not only the fact that other attorneys, such as the counsel to
the President, have the responsibility to serve as the President's lawyer,
but also the statutory mandate which created the position of the Solicitor
General. The responsibility of the Solicitor General is "to attend to the
interests of the United States," 196 not to attend to the interests of the
President or any particular federal official. The wishes of any given fed-
eral official are only part, in some instances a minor part, of the policies
and programs which delineate the interests of the United States. If, for
example, a state were to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and the
President personally thought this a good development for foreign policy,
the "interests of the United States" which the Solicitor General would
have to represent would continue to be controlled by article I, section 10
of the Constitution, which flatly prohibits such grants. The Constitution
and federal statutes literally define what the interests of the United States
are in many instances. The interests of the United States and the cause of
justice coincide because both are vindicated by the fair enforcement of
the law; "to establish justice" is one of the express stated purposes of the
Constitution which the Solicitor General is sworn to uphold and de-
fend.' 97 Thus Solicitor General Sobeloff, although eschewing Perlman's
non-adversarial imagery, made essentially the same point when he ar-
gued, "[T]he solicitor general is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but...
[m]y client's chief business is not to achieve victory but to establish
justice."' 98
Yet Lehmann's creed, like the preamble itself, is necessarily cast in
abstract terms. Over time, the Solicitor General's commitment to seek-
ing justice has taken three different forms. In its broadest sense that
commitment has led the Solicitor General to select the results he seeks in
a given case, not merely in light of vindicating the practices of agency
officials, or winning or saving as much money as possible, but also from
the perspective of what would be in the best long term interests of the
nation as a whole. Solicitor General Griswold observed:
The Solicitor General's client in a particular case cannot be
properly represented before the Supreme Court except from a
broad point of view, taking into account all of the factors which
affect sound government and the proper formulation and devel-
196. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1982); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 518(a) (1982).
197. See Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REc. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y.
649 (1977); cf Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted, but
when criminal trials are fair.").
198. Sobeloff II, supra note 10, at 147-48.
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opment of the law. In providing for the Solicitor General... to
attend to "the interests of the United States" in litigation, the
statutes have always been understood to mean the long-range
interests of the United States, not simply in terms of its fise, or
its success in the particular litigation, but as a government, as a
people. 199
The interests of the United States might be il-served by a decision which,
although entailing victory for a particular agency or official in the dispute
at hand, created rules or precedents that would in other cases result in
substantial hardship or injustice to third parties.2c°
Second, for a century it has been the occasional practice of the Solic-
itor General, at least in cases involving specific individuals rather than
ongoing federal programs, 0 1 to confess error and abandon victories won
in the lower courts. Such a confession of error, although not binding on
the Supreme Court, is usually accepted by the Court. This practice is
utilized primarily in criminal cases202 or in other litigation, such as immi-
gration matters, which "could result in drastic and serious consequence"
for the opposing party.20 3 Confessions of error, although frequently de-
scribed as a single practice undertaken to prevent "a miscarriage of jus-
tice," 204 have in fact been offered, and justified, for several distinct kinds
of reasons. Solicitor General Cox noted that in some instances a confes-
sion of error was required because no plausible basis could be found to
justify the decision below:
I am still persuaded that the practice of confessing error when
we are plainly wrong ought to be continued....
[T]o argue cases that seem unsound is certainly a waste of
the Supreme Court's time ....
In addition, a government lawyer... should [not] be re-
quired to assert propositions which really seem untenable, if
not unconscionable ....205
199. Griswold, supra note 10, at 535 (footnote omitted); see also Cox, supra note 10, at 225
(Solicitor General's office should not take a position "contrary to the public interest").
200. Stem I, supra note 10, at 158. A sample of cases in which the Solicitor General has
confessed error can be found in Comment, supra note 10, at 1468-69 nn.112-21.
201. But see Comment supra note 10, at 1468 n.114 (tax cases).
202. Cox, supra note 10, at 223:
It is in criminal cases that the differences between the government's role, as we con-
ceive it, and the role of the all-out advocate, become most apparent. In the criminal
cases an extraordinary amount of time is spent in looking to see whether the accused
really did have a fair trial, and whether the conviction really should stand.
203. Perlman, supra note 10, at 288.
204. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942).
205. Cox, supra note 10, at 225; see also id. at 224 ("case in which it is our judgment that
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The Solicitor General has also been willing at times to confess error
where he concluded that, although a plausible argument might be avail-
able to support the lower court decision, the decision nonetheless ap-
peared on balance to be incorrect,206 an approach related to Perlman's
judicial model. Finally, the Solicitor General has been willing in the past
to waive the government's right to complain about some procedural de-
fault on the part of a defendant where it appeared that the assertion of
that tactical right by the United States would prevent consideration of a
substantial argument that the decision below was wrong on the merits.
20 7
Confessions of error can have an impact which reaches beyond the
particular litigants involved. Solicitor General Cox commented:
The practice of confessing error.., is especially important be-
cause it affects all litigation. It tests the strength of our belief
that the office has a peculiar responsibility to the Court. It af-
fects the way all our other cases are presented. If we are willing
to take a somewhat disinterested and wholly candid position
even when it means surrendering a victory, then all our other
cases will be presented with a greater degree of restraint, with a
greater degree of candor, and with a longer view, perhaps, than
otherwise.20 8
The Solicitor General's willingness to confess error in some cases doubt-
less contributes to the Solicitor General's credibility with the Court in
other instances.
Third, the Solicitor General's office often attempts, in formulating
its position and arguments on a given issue, to ascertain what the correct
government couldn't and shouldn't win in the Supreme Court"); Perlman, supra note 10, at
288 ("We thought the law was clear that resjudicata had no application to habeas corpus....
In another case the defendant had been convicted under a section of the Selective Service
Regulations not in effect at the time the offense was committed-a point not discovered until
the case reached the Supreme Court. The Government conceded that the conviction was im-
proper."); Stem I, supra note 10, at 158 ("no respectable argument on the Government's
side").
206. Cox, supra note 10, at 223 ("whether the accused really did have a fair trial, and
whether the conviction really should stand"); Perlman, supra note 10, at 289 ("A careful con-
sideration of the record led me to conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a
refusal of citizenship"); Stem I, supra note 10, at 158 (Solicitor General "willing to concede
that the Government was wrong when he was convinced of that fact.").
207. Cox, supra note 10, at 224 (Solicitor General called Court's attention to possibly con-
trolling precedent, or recent decision, overlooked by opposing counsel); Perlman, supra note
10, at 289 (Government waived right to object that inmate petitioner had failed to make a
timely motion to substitute a new warden as respondent); cf Thacher, supra note 54, at 521
("There is in this office a relationship of responsibility to the Courts and to litigants opposed to
the Government which implies that the citizen shall not be impeded in the enforcement of his
rights").
208. Cox, supra note 10, at 225.
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disposition of the case would be from the perspective of a disinterested
judge applying the Supreme Court's reigning precedents. Solicitor Gen-
eral Biddle suggested that in determining his positions the Solicitor Gen-
eral was to be guided only by "the ethic of his law profession framed in
the ambience of his experience and judgment."2" The process involved
is not as abstract or subjective as Biddle's formulation suggests. The law
is an elaborate set of premises, principles, and rules of inference; that
system, when brought together with the facts and legislative and other
materials relevant to a given case, often can fairly be said to point to a
specific conclusion. Legal reasoning, of course, is not mathematics; rea-
sonable minds can disagree about the proper inferences, and a good deal
of judgment and experience is required to evaluate in a given case the
interplay of general principles and particular circumstances. Nonethe-
less, there is an undeniable difference between attempting to ascertain
what result is indicated by an unbiased evaluation of an issue, and trying
to fashion an argument, even a plausible argument, that would lead to a
predetermined outcome.
This attempt to ascertain what the law fairly requires, to look at a
case from the perspective of a judge rather than that of an attorney with
an ordinary client, is important in part because the Solicitor General
must consider what the correct disposition of a question may be in order
to decide where the interests of the United States lie. This approach may
also help to safeguard the integrity of the Solicitor General's informa-
tional responsibilities to the Court. If an attorney in the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office drafts a brief or memorandum with a determination to arrive
at a particular conclusion, that desire will almost inevitably skew the in-
formation-factual or legal-which is set out in the document; in tradi-
tional brief writing of this sort the preferred outcome normally
determines what information is disclosed, emphasized, minimized or ig-
nored. Conversely, if a neutral-principled judge seeks to arrive at the just
determination of an issue, the facts will tend to determine the outcome,
rather than vice versa. Of course, this overstates the differences, for law-
yers can attempt to provide a dispassionate disclosure of the relevant in-
formation, and judges often bring their own preconceptions to a case, but
the less committed an attorney is to reaching a pre-determined result, the
more likely he or she will be to provide a balanced account of the rele-
vant legal and factual circumstances. If a dispassionate analysis of this
sort is part of the brief writing process in the Solicitor General's office,
the likelihood that the ultimate brief will be a balanced one is increased,
209. F. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 97.
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because an attempt to edit out embarrassing or unhelpful facts is more
likely to provoke internal controversy than would a failure ever to men-
tion those circumstances in any working draft or document.
To the extent that the Solicitor General advances a dispassionate
analysis of a given case, unaffected by a desire to arrive at any particular
result, the Solicitor General assists the Court in a manner which is more
than simply informational. Proceeding from premises accepted by a ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, and bearing in mind the concerns and style
of reasoning which affect the Court's own approach, the Solicitor Gen-
eral can scout the legal terrain of a case, and suggest to the Court in a
uniquely persuasive manner how the issues should be resolved. When he
or she proceeds in this way the Solicitor General provides the Court with
something no ordinary litigant could purport to offer, a disinterested
evaluation of the fair and proper disposition of the case, an analysis
which may well involve arguments which neither those litigants nor the
lower courts raised or would want to articulate, and perhaps a different
proposed legal standard as well. It is precisely because of his tradition of
approaching cases in this manner that the Solicitor General has been re-
ferred to as the tenth justice. But although the judicial analogy is apt, the
number is not, for while a tenth justice might proceed from premises
previously rejected by a majority of the Court, the Solicitor General ba-
ses his analysis on the decisions accepted by that majority. The Solicitor
General acts more like a sixth justice, attempting to draft analyses that
would be accepted by five other members of the Court.
The closer the government's position comes to this sort of approach,
the more likely it is to be accepted by the Court; over time the extent to
which the Solicitor General seeks to act like a sixth justice will increase
the credibility of his office with the Supreme Court. A generation ago a
Court source commented: "'It's a perfectly human thing to read a brief
in one frame of mind or another, depending on who wrote it-to feel of a
Solicitor, "Out of that mint can come only true coin." He must be a man
who would rather lose a case here than present it on an unfair basis.' "210
This passage expressly recognizes that a Solicitor General can only main-
tain such a reputation if he is willing to lose cases, and to win some on
grounds narrower than his client might have wished. In cases where the
application of controlling legal principles is particularly clear, the Solici-
tor General's informational responsibility to the Court may make it diffi-
cult or impossible to frame an argument for the result which the Solicitor
General or Administration might prefer as a matter of policy. Explain-
210. Lewis, supra note 73, at 29.
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ing the government's brief in Communications Workers of America v.
Beck,211 which was denounced by conservatives because it defended the
legality of using certain union fees for political purposes,212 Solicitor
General Fried commented:
[P]eople were unhappy about it.... I wasn't happy about the
bottom line .... I have a warm feeling towards the Right to
Work Committee and as a philosophical matter I am more
sympathetic to the Committee's view of what the world should
look like than the other side. On the other hand, this was a
court request and I was asked to tell the truth. They asked us
to tell the truth about what the words of the Taft-Hartley Act
and what the legislative history meant. And to tell the truth
about the doctrine of state action. I simply had to face the
M iC213music. 21
Professor Neuborne has suggested that the Solicitor General, in for-
mulating positions and framing arguments, ought to function, and tradi-
tionally has functioned, solely, or at least primarily, in this sort of sixth
justice role, providing the Court and the President with "reliable, non-
ideological and essentially non-political... technically excellent advice
about what the law is ... as opposed to which it ought to be."21 4 On
Neuborne's view a Solicitor General who takes into consideration the
actual policies of an administration would be little more than a "mouth-
piece" for the President, "an ideological cheerleader for the administra-
tion, as concerned with justifying deviations from legal norms as with
assuring compliance with the law."21 The 1977 OLC Memorandum of-
fered a variant of this approach, insisting that although the Solicitor
General ought to frame the government's legal positions without regard
to administration practice or policy, in certain special and infrequent cir-
cumstances the Attorney General might properly overrule the Solicitor
General on policy grounds.216
These analyses do not provide a realistic account of how in the past
Solicitors General have arrived at the government's position on a given
question. Each year the Solicitor General's office files literally scores of
briefs in Supreme Court cases which either directly affect some ongoing
211. 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 2480 (1987).
212. Key Justice Official Sides With Union Bosses, Human Events, May 9, 1987, at 1 [here-
inafter Union Bosses].
213. A Special Interview with Solicitor General Charles Fried, 1 WASHINGTON LAWYER 48,
50 (May-June 1985).
214. Neuborne Testimony, supra note 7, at 5-6.
215. Id. at 7.
216. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 228, 234-35.
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federal program or activity, or are important to the broader goals of the
administration.21 7 The fact that the Solicitor General's briefs almost in-
variably support those activities or goals, albeit with somewhat varying
degrees of enthusiasm, is not simply a curious but recurrent coincidence.
Obviously, consideration of actual government practice and policy does
consistently play a major role in the way in which the Solicitor General's
office formulates positions and frames arguments, and until recently this
had not been thought to be a proper basis of criticism. The litigation
goals of liberal administrations were not disparaged as mere "ideology,"
and Solicitors General who advanced government policies under, for ex-
ample, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were not dismissed as
"mouthpieces."
That government policy should play such a role is neither surprising
nor undesirable. Of course, there would be a serious problem if the Solic-
itor General were to give decisive weight to defending government policy
when there was simply no plausible legal basis for that policy. If, for
example, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) simply
refused to make grants to Massachusetts, insisting the Bay State was re-
ally a province of Canada, and the White House supported that view
because it favored the removal of several annoying liberal Democrats
from Congress, the Solicitor General, refusing to advance an argument
that was obviously frivolous, would have to urge the Supreme Court to
hold that HHS had acted illegally. But cases of such patent illegality by
federal agencies are rare-not as rare as they used to be, perhaps, but
rare nonetheless. The complexities of modem life and government
spawn a never-ending series of legal issues regarding which there are no
dispositive Supreme Court precedents. The legal profession prospers be-
cause it is so often possible to frame, on the basis of existing precedents,
entirely colorable arguments on both sides of a given legal issue. A sig-
nificant portion of the cases which the Supreme Court decides on the
merits are accepted for review only after, and indeed because, lower
court judges have come to conflicting conclusions.218 It is often impossi-
ble to declare with any degree of certainty how a majority of the Supreme
Court would rule on a given issue. The question, assuming it is a differ-
ent question, regarding what the law on the issue really "is," is at least as
difficult to resolve.
217. On occasion the Court may ask the Solicitor General to express the views of the
United States regarding a question of federal law which has no impact on Administration
programs or policies; when that occurs the Solicitor General is free to advance whatever con-
clusion appears to him.most consistent with the relevant facts, precedents, and statutory or
legislative materials.
218. See Sup. Cr. REv. 17.1.
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When, as is frequently the case, the law is unclear, it is far harder to
maintain that the Solicitor General should frame the government's legal
position without regard to its consequences for the policies of the federal
government. The problem is very much one of degree. The less clear the
law is on a given issue, the less likely it is that arguing for government
policies would be inconsistent with any obligation to the Court; the more
important the policy involved, the greater the Solicitor General's obliga-
tion to defend it. One could, of course, maintain that the Solicitor Gen-
eral should adhere to his or her personal views about the law no matter
how close the legal issues; even if, for example, the Solicitor General
thinks the odds he or she is correct are only fifty-one of one hundred.
But this would overuse beyond all reason the sometimes benign fiction
that the law, and answers to all legal issues, exist, like an elaborate
Corpus Juris Tertium, engraved in some enormous set of ethereal tablets,
awaiting discovery by the eye of the mind. There are simply legal issues
about which reasonable lawyers can disagree-about what the law is,
about what the Supreme Court will do-and the nature of the Solicitor
General's obligations in such cases is different than in cases in which the
law is, in one sense or the other, clear.
The proper role of the Solicitor General seems to be to strike a deli-
cate balance between justice and advocacy, considering the clarity of the
law, on the one hand, and the nature and significance of the affected
policy or program, on the other. Outright confessions of error have tra-
ditionally been limited to cases affecting only a few individuals. Where
an agency program or the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, the
Solicitor General ordinarily looks very hard for some plausible ground,
however narrow, to sustain that activity or enactment; the law being
what it is, some such argument can usually be found, although the Solici-
tor General may blush a bit when he or she makes it in open court. The
Solicitor General's effort to find some basis for defending an ongoing fed-
eral practice may serve the interests of the Court, which might otherwise
be left to resolve a question of general application and importance with-
out having heard arguments on both sides of the issue. When the issue
before the Court is neither the validity of a statute or ongoing program
nor a question with serious potential financial impact on the United
States, the Solicitor General, while bearing in mind the policy prefer-
ences of agency officials whose activities might be incidentally affected,
may appropriately give greater weight to what seems to him the correct
disposition of the underlying legal dispute. Particularly complex and in-
teresting problems often arise when the Solicitor General undertakes to
determine which legal theory to offer in support of the administration's
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programs or policies and whether to file an amicus brief in a case to
which no federal agency or official is a party. These situations typically
present the Solicitor General with a range of positions of varying co-
gency, each of which, in turn, would have a different degree or type of
impact on. various agency or administration policies and practices that
may or may not themselves be directly under challenge in the case itself.
Given the wide range of positions that may be possible in a case, and the
differing possible ramifications of various arguments, it is entirely normal
and probably desirable that the attempt to strike the proper balance will
occasionally provoke spirited disagreements within the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office and the administration as a whole. It is entirely appropriate
that the final choice between plausible alternatives be made in part in
order to further, rather than frustrate, the practices and policies of the
Solicitor General's agency client, even if the result may be a position
which the Solicitor General might not have favored were he or she on the
bench.219
To insist, when it is contrary to fact, that administration policy
plays no role in the decisions of the Solicitor General is to risk turning
the Solicitor General's office into a smokescreen behind which executive
branch officials can make and seek to implement policy while denying
any political responsibility or accountability. That occurred during the
Bob Jones controversy when, in the face of fierce public criticism of its
decision to grant tax exempt status to segregated private schools, the ad-
ministration insisted that it actually opposed such treatment as a matter
of policy, and that it had decided to grant the exemptions solely because
its lawyers discovered they were legally required.220 The patent mendac-
ity of that assertion fooled no one. But it demonstrated, to use an image
coined by CIA Director Casey in another context, that by insisting that
the Solicitor General's decisions are always made purely on legal
grounds, an administration could turn the Solicitor General's office into
an off-the-shelf self-contained operation for making and implementing
policies while giving the White House a claim of plausible deniability.
To suggest that the Solicitor General is an impervious bastion of juris-
prudential rectitude, while the rest of the Justice Department is totally
dominated by policy considerations, is to ignore as well the important
extent to which other officials within the Department should and often
219. See Union Bosses, supra note 212, at 7 ("if you've got a couple of different legitimate
interpretations... why don't you pick the interpretation that supports our overall policy? The
trouble with Fried is he doesn't know what the hell he's here for.").
220. These events are briefly summarized in L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 58-60.
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do attempt to temper policy goals with concern for the broader interests
of the nation and of the law.
Conversely, to insist that administration policy and policy makers
ought to have no role in the Solicitor General's decisions is to run the
equally serious risk that the policy views of the Solicitor General person-
ally, or of his or her staff, will color the government's briefs, especially in
those cases in which ordinary legal reasoning can provide no clear an-
swer, and that briefs may be filed which attack or undermine administra-
tion policy. Conservatives criticized Solicitor General Lee for failing to
support, and even opposing, President Reagan's policies.221 That criti-
cism may well have been unwarranted in fact, both because the Reagan
Administration's policies were often a matter of considerable internal
dispute, and because Lee was frequently constrained by the limits of
plausible argument; but a charge of this sort, if accurate, ought to be a
troubling one. The possible consequences of acting on the view advanced
by Professor Neuborne were demonstrated during the Carter Adminis-
tration in connection with Regents of University of California v. Bakke.222
As of 1977 there were virtually no Supreme Court precedents shedding
light on the constitutionality and legality of affirmative action, and a to-
tally plausible argument could have been made on either side of the issue,
a state of affairs starkly reflected in the four-one-four vote by which
Bakke was ultimately decided on the merits. Under those circumstances
it was unreasonable to suggest that the substance of the government's
position should have turned on whether or not Solicitor General McCree
personally thought the plan in Bakke constitutional. But although Presi-
dent Carter publicly supported such plans, the White House was not ini-
tially consulted by Solicitor General McCree when he drafted a brief
arguing that the affirmative action plan at issue in Bakke was invalid.
Attorney General Griffin Bell insisted that McCree had acted correctly
and that it was the exclusive job of the Solicitor General to decide what
position the government would take in any given case. Bell deliberately
thwarted White House efforts to advise McCree regarding the position
the President wanted the government's brief to take, treating those direc-
tions as if they were equivalent to an improper ex parte communication
221. McClellan, supra note 21, at 2 ("Lee... has repeatedly taken positions that are di-
rectly at odds with the President's program"); id. at 4 ("Lee not only opposes the President's
program, but has contributed to its defeat"); id. at 10 ("Lee's deviation from the Reagan Ad-
ministration's policies"; "Lee... has actually argued against the President's basic philosophy
of government").
222. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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to a sitting judge.22 3 The maintenance of that sort of environment runs
some risk of encouraging lawyers in the Solicitor General's office to casu-
ally assume that any legal view other than their own, especially if more
attuned to administration policy, is necessarily outside the bounds of
plausible argument.
The responsibility of the Solicitor General to balance justice and ad-
vocacy may confront him with either or both of two types of conflicting
responsibilities. First, of course, that balancing process itself ultimately
requires the Solicitor General to choose between his obligations to take
the course that seems most consistent with the law, and his duty to ad-
vance the policies of the government. Second, the Solicitor General may
be forced to engage in a form of litigation triage, confessing error, or
abandoning arguments in some cases, in order to strengthen, or protect,
the government's credibility in others.
VI. IDENTIFYING THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Identifying the policy of the United States on a given legal issue, and
assessing its importance, might at first seem to be simple tasks. In the
large number of cases in which a federal agency, or its officials, are al-
ready a party, the government policy would appear to be whatever relief
had been sought by the federal plaintiff, or whatever activity was being
defended by the federal defendant. In practice, however, ascertaining the
nature of government policy is often far from simple.
For the Solicitor General the posture taken by the federal parties
when a case was in the lower courts represents only the policy of that
federal agency, not of the United States; indeed, it may constitute only
the policy of that agency for the purposes of the particular litigation at
issue. Any one or more of three types of intragovernmental policy con-
flicts may actually prove to be present. First, the legal position which the
agency wants to take in the case at hand may be bad for that very agency
in some subsequent case; a harsh rule regarding the deadline for filing
notices of appeal, for example, could be detrimental to the agency in
other litigation.224 Second, a legal rule that would generally be good for
223. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 42-48; G. BELL & R. OsTRow, TAKING CARE OF THE
LAW 29-32 (1982).
224. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74 at 278-79 (testimony of Solicitor General Gris-
wold) ("It is important that the positions to be taken by a single agency on a question of
general concern to the Federal Government and all of its agencies reflect the overall best inter-
ests of the entire federal government, and not just the interest of the particular agency in
winning the particular case .... If there were no such control of the agencies' litigation by the
Solicitor General, a particular agency, by pressing its particular case in the Supreme Court,
might produce a result that would redound to the overall detriment of the federal govern-
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one agency might be adverse to the interests of, and opposed by, another
agency.225 Some problems of this sort arise out of the different roles of
the agencies involved. Within the Justice Department itself, the civil di-
vision, which often represents federal officials and agencies when they are
sued, might prefer procedural rules that favor defendants, while the anti-
trust or civil rights divisions, which generally initiate litigation, would
want procedural rules that aid plaintiffs. Some federal agencies are in the
business of enforcing statutes applicable, directly or indirectly, to other
federal agencies; thus the Defense Department, which pays the bills of
cost-plus contractors, is naturally inclined to favor a narrower interpreta-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) than the Wage and Hour"
Administrator at the Department of Labor might be.226 Third, among
officials or agencies with no inherently different institutional interests,
there may be simple differences of opinion about what government policy
ought to be. Under the Reagan Administration, for example, there have
been repeated internal disagreements about civil rights issues.
Where such differences exist, the Solicitor General should not un-
dertake to frame a position without first attempting to ascertain what
result the government wants to achieve in the case, not because the Solic-
itor General will or ought cavalierly argue for whatever result his agency
clients may prefer, but because the Solicitor General, while retaining the
ultimate responsibility for deciding what position will be set forth in the
government's brief, would not want to make that decision in ignorance of
the preference of the affected agencies, if they are indeed capable of
agreeing on a single preference. The existence of a case raising the ques-
tion at issue in the Supreme Court often requires the resolution of policy
differences that may have coexisted in the past, because the action of the
Court is likely to affect all interested federal agencies, and because, even
if the Court skirts that issue, the Solicitor General will be obligated in
ment."); Comment, supra note 10, at 1463 ("The Solicitor General often argues for either a
more even-handed balancing of different policies within an agency's jurisdiction, or for greater
agency sensitivity to the broader implications of its ruling.").
225. Attorney General Clark once warned that if individual agencies could pursue appeals
in the Supreme Court "without the Solicitor General, their objective [would] be so single-
minded that they will ignore... the broad objectives of the United States." 1949 Hearings,
supra note 95, at 123. Solicitor General Griswold once observed about cases involving the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): "[I]n all of these cases there are inevitably other
interests of the Government and the only place where all the interests come together to be
considered is in the Office of the Solicitor General." 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at
287.
226. See Perlman, supra note 10, at 282-83; Comment, supra note 10, at 1460 ("An overt
conflict may develop because an agency's or department's decision affecting one economic in-
terest may adversely affect a group represented by another governmental body.").
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any subsequent brief to take a position consistent with that taken in the
first.227 It may at times be important that the United States speak with
one voice in the Supreme Court, but it is ordinarily essential that the
administration speak with one voice to the Solicitor General, for the So-
licitor General cannot in a single argument defend two inconsistent
agency practices, or advance two conflicting policies. Frequently, there-
fore, the Solicitor General, in need of a consensus, or failing that, a deci-
sion, about what result the government will favor, finds himself
mediating multilateral discussions among the interested client agencies
and officials, and their lawyers, discussions which may be framed in
terms of policy, but which more often are cast as legal arguments ad-
vanced by the participants in support of their preferred policies. Some-
times these exchanges result in a genuine agreement as to what federal
policy should be, as each party comes to recognize the legitimate con-
cerns of the others.228 Occasionally the result is a negotiated settlement
yielding a brief that reads more like a consent decree, or a treaty, with
various portions of the text and footnotes making arguments that point
in somewhat different directions, or a brief which deliberately avoids ad-
dressing, or even mentioning, the particular issues about which there
were unresolved intragovernmental disagreements.
In some instances, however, the interested federal officials will sim-
ply not be able to agree on how to set the government policy that might
227. See Bork, supra note 49, at 204; Stem I, supra note 10, at 217.
228. Bork, supra note 49, at 703 ("Many... decisions are extremely difficult and require
the resolution of conflicting philosophies of different agencies and divisions. I have been
through four such conferences already and have escaped unscathed so far, but I can see that it
is impossible to arrive at an amicable settlement every time."); Comment, supra note 10, at
1459 (Solicitor General "is most successful in resolving disputes among the divisions of the
Justice Department and among the executive departments."). See also 1973 House Hearings,
supra note 74, at 274:
There are problems... varying interests between different agencies of the Gov-
emnment, where I think the Solicitor General's Office frequently works out bases
upon which the Government's views can be most effectively presented.
I remember a case [in which] ... [t]he Registrar of Copyrights... had very
strong views ...and the Federal Communications Commission had very strong
views... and the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice had very strong
views ....
They were all different views, and one way to handle it, of course, would have
been to let each of these people file their own brief in the Supreme Court and let the
Court consider all the arguments that could be made, involving, I suppose, the read-
ing of three such briefs, 200 or 250 pages of arguments, much of which would have
been duplicative and repetitious.
Instead, we held extensive conferences, first with each agency separately and
then with all three agencies together so each could understand the viewpoint of the
other. We finally worked out a brief which had wide acceptance by the three agen-
cies, though not complete agreement.
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affect, but would not necessarily control, the Solicitor General's choice
among plausible legal arguments. If the disagreement is an entirely legal
one, not colored or motivated by policy differences, the Solicitor General
may resolve the matter based on his best judgment as to what the law
requires, or may advise the Court of those differences, setting them forth
in a single brief2 29 or authorizing the filing of more than one brief.
Where, however, two or more agencies favor different government posi-
tions, not simply because of divergent views of the law, but because as a
matter of policy they want different results, the Solicitor General may,
and often must, frame the government's position solely on the basis of his
evaluation of the legal principles at issue, but ought not base that position
on his personal opinions regarding what administration policy ought to
be. As Solicitor General Bork correctly emphasized, the Solicitor Gen-
eral's responsibility is to identify and advance government policy, not to
make it.230 The existence of an interagency policy dispute does not con-
229. See, eg., Comment, supra note 10, at 1465.
230. The following is an excerpt from the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the nomination of Robert Bork for Solicitor General:
Senator HART. It is a policy post?
Mr. BORK. Not particularly, Senator. I view it as a post of being the attorney for
the Government.
Senator HART. What if the Government takes a position in the field of antitrust or
civil rights that you think is wrong, and have said in the past is wrong, what do you
do?
Mr. BORK. What will I do? I will enforce the policy of Government in antitrust as
the Government defines it. I do not define it, Senator.
I might say that in practice both for defendants in antitrust cases and for plain-
tiffs in antitrust cases I frequently urged positions that as an academic I would
criticize.
Senator HART. If the Assistant Attorney General in charge of civil rights has rec-
ommended action be taken against a school district or several school districts, or if
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of antitrust wants to go after a conglomer-
ate, and you believe on the law that you would take a different view in both cases if
you were the Assistant Attorney General, as Solicitor General what do you do?
Mr. BORK. Well, of course, Senator, the initial determination to file a lawsuit
against a conglomerate or against a school district would not come within my office
at all.
Senator HART. That is right.
Mr. BORK. Those cases would be filed and then come to me, if at all, upon appeal.
At that stage, I am sure that I would continue the policy of the Justice Department,
even if I disagreed as an academic with that policy. But that, I take it, is not relevant
to my performance of my duties; that is, my personal academic disagreement would
not be relevant to the performance of these duties.
Bork Hearings, supra note 30, at 8.
Senator TUNNEY .... I have gained the impression that you are prepared to put
aside your own personal philosophy and to argue cases on appeal and to bring cases
up on appeal on the basis of the policy as enunciated by the agencies and the Attor-
ney General ... 
Mr. BORK. That is correct, Senator.
Id. at 24. See also Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Jackson to be Solicitor General
before a Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1938):
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vert the Solicitor General's office into a sort of ad hoc policy-making
body like the Office of Management and Budget. If the Secretary of La-
bor and the Secretary of Defense disagree about what result to seek in an
FLSA case, and a plausible argument can be made for both sides, the
Solicitor General has no mandate to make a policy-based decision.
Ordinarily no dispositive policy decision will be forthcoming from
other quarters. Often the underlying policy dispute simply will not be of
sufficient importance to refer to the President or a high level White
House aide, particularly where a considerable amount of time and effort
would be required to master the relevant arguments and issues; at times
the disagreements will be among middle level officials, and never cross
the desk of any cabinet secretary. Time constraints frequently preclude
referring such matters to the White House, for the underlying differences
may involve not maturely developed policies which pre-dated the appeal
at issue, but positions which first emerged during the process of attempt-
ing to frame a government brief; by the time those differences have be-
come clear, the deadline for filing that brief may be only days away. If
no definitive policy decision is to be had, the Solicitor General is in an
unusual position. In the absence of any consensus, compromise, or deci-
sion, there simply is no executive branch policy to represent. As a conse-
quence, the element of policy drops from the normal balancing process,
and the Solicitor General is left to frame the government's position based
on his or her best judgment as to what the law requires.23
Precisely because the framing of a Supreme Court brief may precipi-
tate an important, possibly hotly contested internal policy-making dis-
pute, the Solicitor General, whose office will be at the center of that
controversy, has an obligation to safeguard the integrity of that process,
whether it is a process that results in a consensus, a compromise, or a
deadlock breaking higher level decision. The Solicitor General must be
careful to assure, first, that all interested agencies and officials are, in an
appropriate manner, drawn into the process. Because these policy-re-
lated disputes arise in the context of litigation, officials at the Department
of Justice may be more likely than others to be aware that a decision is in
Senator KING: I will ask you whether the Solicitor General has charge of the anti-
trust policy ....
Attorney General CUMMINGS: No. That would be the task of Mr. Jackson's suc-
cessor, whoever he might be, just as it is now Mr. Jackson's task.
Jackson was in charge of the antitrust division at the time he was nominated to serve as Solici-
tor General.
231. Under some circumstances the Solicitor General might choose to disclose the existence
of that unresolved dispute, or even to present in a single brief the differing positions advanced
by the agencies involved.
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the offing. The Solicitor General cannot assume that lawyers or division
heads in the Department speak for, or have even consulted with, all rele-
vant constituent agencies, or that any official from whom he has not
heard knows of the case and is indifferent about its disposition. Despite
the fact that increasing the number of participants may aggravate the
magnitude of the internal controversy, the Solicitor General has an obli-
gation to the administration as a whole to bring the matter to the atten-
tion of all relevant officials and to solicit an expression of their views.
2 32
Second, when a given case calls into question an established federal
program, be it in the form of an ongoing activity or a duly promulgated
regulation or guideline, the Solicitor General should not allow the gov-
ernment's brief to become a vehicle by which disgruntled administration
factions seek to undermine in the courts a policy which they have been
unable to change in practice. This is not a merely hypothetical problem.
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,233 for example, the
defendants in effect attacked the validity of certain Title VI regulations,
adopted by some forty federal agencies,23 4 which prohibited recipients of
federal grants from engaging in practices which had a racially discrimi-
natory effect; the Solicitor General declined to file a brief defending those
regulations, in large measure because Assistant Attorney General Reyn-
olds was personally opposed to any use of a discriminatory effect stan-
dard.2 35  Similarly, in Grove City College v. Bell,2 36 although the
applicable Department of Education regulations applied Title IX's ban
on discrimination to the entire educational institution receiving federal
financial aid,2 37 the Solicitor General argued that the law should be con-
strued to apply only to the specific program in which federal funds were
being expended. Conversely, in many of the instances in which Solicitor
General Lee was criticized by conservatives for failing to defend the Pres-
ident's policies, the briefs in controversy had in fact defended existing
regulations which, however much conservatives might have disliked
them, the Reagan appointees in charge of those agencies had chosen not
to alter.238 The writing of regulations or guidelines, and the operation of
232. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 279-80.
233. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
234. Id. at 592 n.13.
235. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 91.
236. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
237. Id. at 592-93 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Prior to the filing of the gov-
ernment's brief in Guardians, Solicitor General Lee was criticized for failing to support the
Civil Rights Division on this issue. McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 611.
238. Solicitor General Lee's defense of the regulations regarding discrimination in insur-
ance benefits was denounced in the National Review, McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 611, and in
Benchmark, McClellan, supra note 21, at 9-10 (discussing Long Island Univ. v. Spirit, 463
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programs, are the most definitive form of policy-making in an adminis-
tration.239 Where policy has been established in this way, the Solicitor
General ought to regard those decisions as controlling any policy ques-
tions relevant to the government's position. The Solicitor General must,
of course, consider the possibility that policies made in this manner were
nonetheless unlawful, but where a plausible argument can be made in
support of such formally promulgated policies, the Solicitor General
should decline to entertain proposals that the policies be attacked or un-
dermined by means of the government's Supreme Court briefs, and
should instead advise critics of those policies, whether inside or outside
the administration, to take any proposals for policy changes to the Presi-
dent or to the agency officials who established the policies in dispute.
The Solicitor General must regard with skepticism claims by individual
administration officials that their personal views reflect the unspoken
preferences of the President, and should discount those claims in their
entirety where they conflict with the actual policies of other officials who
are vested with the authority for administering the programs at issue.
Third, where the existence of a Supreme Court case requires the
government to fashion a policy where no policy, or no clear policy, ex-
isted before, or prompts the administration to reconsider and change a
policy, the Solicitor General should assure that the existence of that pol-
icy decision is made clear, and kept distinct from, the legal argument
offered to support it. Preserving this distinction serves two important
purposes. First, it protects the Solicitor General from criticism by the
public and, more importantly, the Court, for decisions that were not his
own. For example, once a regulation has been promulgated, the Court is
unlikely to fault the Solicitor General for defending it, even if only a thin
defense can be adduced; but if no policy decision can be identified, the
Court will be left with the impression that the Solicitor General has made
a personal judgment that the position he is advancing, dicey though it
may be, is the correct disposition of the issues. Second, a public display
of policy-making will at times be important to the integrity of the policy-
making process. If the relevant agency or White House officials can, by
hiding behind the Solicitor General's skirts, avoid taking responsibility
U.S. 1223 (1983) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Lee's defense of the Title IX
regulations prohibiting federal grantees to engage in employment discrimination on the basis of
sex was also criticized in Benchmark. McClellan, supra note 21, at 9 (asserting that Lee's
support of the Department of Education's regulations was "against the wishes of Secretary
Bell" (discussing North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972)). It is unclear why Benchmark did not suggest that Secre-
tary Bell ought to change the regulations at issue.
239. See Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
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for the particular result sought in the government's brief, the political
accountability of those officials, and of the administration as a whole, will
be lessened. At least where a controversial issue is involved, the Solicitor
General ought to be prepared to insist that he will not file a brief in
support of a policy decision for which the administration, and its appro-
priate officials, are unwilling first to take clear public responsibility.
Finally, the Solicitor General must exercise considerable caution
about permitting government briefs to become a weapon in a policy dis-
pute between the executive branch and Congress. The statutory respon-
sibility of the Solicitor General is to represent "the interests of the United
States," a phrase which includes not only the President and his adminis-
tration, but Congress as well.2" The Solicitor General should be sensi-
tive to the possibility that the issue raised by a given case may involve a
policy matter about which the executive branch and Congress are in disa-
greement. Of course, Congress makes policy, in its most formal manner,
through legislation, while regulations and executive orders are the most
unequivocal expression of executive branch policy-making, 'and open
conflicts between the two branches are often resolved by votes and ve-
toes. But on a day-to-day basis in Washington the process of policy-
making, both within and between the two branches of government, is
both more complex and less formal. In other contexts legislative leaders
participate in policy-making through an informal, consultative process,
and there is no reason why that could not occur as well where the policy
at issue is one which would inform the Solicitor General's decision in the
framing of a brief. Although this may not have been the practice in the
past, where there appear to be relevant policy differences between the
administration and Congress, the Solicitor General, in order to ascertain
the policies and interests of the United States, might seek to encourage a
policy consensus, or compromise, acceptable to Congress as well as to
possibly differing officials within the executive branch. Federal law re-
quires the Justice Department to notify Congress if it intends to decline
to defend the constitutionality of a congressionally enacted statute;241
surely some less formal type of communication might be appropriate if
the Solicitor General is considering arguing for a result which he has
reason to believe may be contrary to the wishes of the legislative branch.
Where some form of agreement cannot be reached, it may still be appro-
240. Conservatives repeatedly criticized Solicitor General Lee for defending the constitu-
tionality of statutes which were inconsistent with the policies of President Reagan. McLaugh-
lin, supra note 21, at 611 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); See, e.g., McClellan, supra
note 21, at 6-7 (Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 to State Employee; application of Fair Labor Standards Act to cities).
241. 2 U.S.C. § 288(k)(b) (1982).
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priate for the Solicitor General to file a brief on behalf of the executive
branch alone, but the very attempt to reach that agreement will make the
Solicitor General's actions more informed and deliberate, and will alert
Congress to an issue concerning which it may wish to retain its own
counsel.242 Discussions with legislative leaders who were actually in-
volved in the framing of a statute, like similar discussions which now
occur with the executive branch officials involved, may also have the inci-
dental effect of assisting the Solicitor General's efforts to determine the
correct interpretation of that legislation. Because consultations of this
sort have not been common in the past, a degree of caution and discre-
tion would undoubtedly be advisable, but some tentative steps in this
direction seem to be in order. In the absence of such procedures, the
Solicitor General runs the risk of being conscripted, as evidently oc-
curred in Thornburg v. Gingles,243 into an agency's efforts to refight in the
Court a battle lost in the halls of Congress.
A second, very different type of problem arises when the policy is-
sues posed by a case are the subject of a disagreement between an in-
dependent agency and either the White House, an executive department,
or another independent agency. Certain executive agencies are granted
independent status precisely for the purpose of assuring that neither the
President, nor any executive department, including the Department of
Justice, can control their policies, practices or programs. In other con-
texts the statutory charters of those agencies are sufficiently specific to
effectively guarantee their autonomy; where those programs or policies
are under attack or at issue in the Supreme Court, however, the Solicitor
General's ability to control the representation of those agencies presents
a serious potential threat to their autonomy. The manner in which the
Solicitor General deals with this problem appears to have changed over
the course of the last several decades.
Writing in 1960, Robert Stem, who served as acting Solicitor Gen-
eral in 1952-1953, indicated that the practice of the Solicitor General's
office, in the case of an intragovernmental dispute involving an indepen-
dent agency, was at that time to permit the agency to make its case to the
Supreme Court:
These intragovernmental disagreements cannot be settled
internally by the Department of Justice. . . . [I]ndependent
agencies ... are not bound to accept the Attorney General's
opinion ....
242. For a discussion of cases in which Congress and the executive branch had separate
representation in the Supreme Court, see 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 295-96.
243. 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986); see also surpa note 1 and accompanying text.
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The Solicitor General has an equal duty to represent each
of the two competing Government interests or agencies. In
such situations he will try to determine impartially which posi-
tion he thinks is correct. If he agrees entirely with one side he
will give it his support. Sometimes he takes an intermediate
position, filing a separate brief of his own. Sometimes he stays
out of a case and lets the agencies fight it out themselves. The
Court is always apprised of the intragovernmental conflict, and
I know of no case in which the Solicitor General has precluded
an independent agency from presenting its position. 2'
In 1969, however, a Yale Law Journal Comment, based on interviews
with Solicitors General Griswold and Cox and the staff of the Solicitor
General's office, reported a sharp change in the treatment of such dis-
putes. Instances in which the Solicitor General permitted the presenta-
tion to the Court of independent agency views with which he disagreed
by then occurred only "infrequently":
Where basic policy considerations involving competing statu-
tory or economic interests are involved, the Solicitor General
considers it his responsibility to resolve the conflict himself...
The Solicitor General's staff suggested two rationales for
shielding the Court from intragovernmental conflicts: (1) that
the Executive has a positive obligation to present one position
to the Court and (2) that the muting of conflict also avoids
overburdening the Court with an excessive number of petitions
or arguments. 245
The Comment argued that "[tihe bias in favor of resolving conflicts
within the Executive, especially where the regulatory agencies are con-
cerned, seems ill-considered .... [W]here the Solicitor General's disa-
greement with an agency . . . stems from policy disputes, the agency
should be allowed access... [to the Court]. 2 46
In 1973, Solicitor General Griswold, testifying in opposition to pro-
posals to permit the SEC to handle its own cases in the Supreme Court,
advised the Congress that there was a "customary practice of permitting
the agency to file its own amicus brief when there was a disagreement
between it and the Department of Justice ... ."247 Three years later,
however, when the EEOC sought to ifie just such an amicus brief in
244. Stem I, supra note 10, at 157, col. 1.
245. Comment, supra note 10, at 1466.
246. Id.
247. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 74, at 284; see also id. at 290.
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DeFunis v. Odegaard,48 Solicitor General Bork not only refused to au-
thorize the Commission to do so, but successfully urged the Supreme
Court to return unfiled an amicus brief which the EEOC had submitted
to the Court clerk. 49 In 1977 the OLC Memorandum of that year
asserted:
[I]t has been thought to be desirable, generally, for the Govern-
ment to adopt a single, coherent position with respect to legal
questions that are presented to the Supreme Court. Because it
is not uncommon for there to be conflicting views among the
various offices and agencies within the executive branch, the
Solicitor General, having the responsibility for presenting the
views of the Government to the Court, must have power to rec-
oncile differences among his clients, to accept the views of some
and to reject others, aid, in proper cases, to formulate views of
his own.25°
The Memorandum contained no hint that the exercise of such a power
was any less appropriate or, indeed, desirable, when the client whose
views the Solicitor General chose to reject was an independent agency.
The significance of this difference in approach may for a while have
been masked by the lack of sharp recurring differences within past ad-
ministrations, by a reluctance on the part of earlier Solicitors General to
actually override and silence an independent agency whose policies and
practices might be at issue in the Supreme Court, and by the success of
the Solicitor General's office in hammering out positions acceptable both
to those agencies and to executive departments. During the Reagan Ad-
ministration, however, when the Justice Department, and particularly
Assistant Attorney General Reynolds, were frequently at loggerheads
with the EEOC, the Solicitor General repeatedly advanced only the
views of the Department, declining either to authorize the filing of sepa-
rate EEOC briefs or to disclose to the Supreme Court the existence or
nature of those interagency disputes.251 In 1985, the Court was treated
to the spectacle of a government brief in Sheet Metal Workers v.
248. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
249. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1974, at 13, col. 6-7; see 415 U.S. 908 (1974) (order denying
EEOC motion). The controversy was somewhat unusual in that Solicitor General Bork had
chosen, not to file on behalf of the administration a brief expressing a different position than
that of the EEOC, but to file no brief at all, possibly because of unresolved differences within
the administration. The EEOC, although not within any of the executive departments subject
to supervision and control by the President, does not have the quasi-legislative and adjudica-
tory powers of agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission.
250. 1977 Memorandum, supra note 10, at 230.
251. Compare Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) with EEOCMemo, supra note 64, at
E-1 (EEOC taking position contrary to Solicitor General).
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EEOC2"2 which denounced as illegal and unconstitutional the very af-
firmative action remedy which the EEOC had litigated for years to win
in that case-a change of position which occasioned comment in the
Court's opinion.253 It is entirely understandable that an administration
which sees itself embroiled in a series of apocalyptic ideological battles
would no more want to afford the EEOC access to the Supreme Court
than the regime in Managua would want to give La Prensa paper and
ink. But agencies like the EEOC have statutory charters which guaran-
tee their independence, and it would be more consistent with that legisla-
tion if the Solicitor General were to adhere to the philosophy expressed
by Stem a generation ago.
VII. CONCLUSION
At first blush the dilemma of the Solicitor General seems very much
like that of Becket himself, rewarded with an exalted position one of
whose very functions was to resist overreaching claims by the man who
gave him the job. In the short term the Solicitor General may well find
himself forced to make painful choices between his obligations to the
Supreme Court and his loyalties to the administration in which he serves.
But in the long ran-or more likely the middle run, since a single Term
would probably suffice to make the point-those conflicts, although real,
are equally, if not primarily, conflicts in the demands placed on the Solic-
itor General by the various agencies, officials and factions within the ad-
ministration. A Solicitor General who devoted himself with abandon to
an administration's causes would soon discover that his zeal, however
popular in the Executive Office Building or other ruling circles, had
quickly and seriously impaired his effectiveness as an appellate litigator.
The tradition respected by past Solicitors General of seeking to serve the
Court as well as the administration has a pragmatic as well as an idealis-
tic basis; the Solicitor General's office adheres to that tradition not-or at
least, not only-because its staff is unusually principled, or because the
Court makes special demands on those lawyers, but because the large
volume of government litigation in the Supreme Court compels the Solic-
itor General to husband his or her credibility with the Justices. That is a
lesson which, if initially ignored by a new Solicitor General, will inevita-
bly be relearned, at considerable cost to the Solicitor General, to his cli-
ents, and to the Court. Extremism in pursuit of any of the President's
programs is not simply a vice, it is bad lawyering.
252. 474 U.S. 815 (1986).
253. 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3034 n.24 (1986). See also id. at 3049 n.46.
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A Solicitor General's enthusiastic desire to represent the administra-
tion which appointed him may initially blind him to the conflicts within
that administration. Zealotry on behalf of a given cause may impair the
accuracy and balance of the Solicitor General's description of the law
and facts, cloud the Solicitor General's assessment as to the limits of
plausible argument, or skew his judgment as to the correct balance of
justice and advocacy, errors which over time will impair the Solicitor
General's stature with the Court and thus his ability to represent other
causes. The allocation of essentially limited resources, the forty or so
certiorari petitions to be filed each year, or the modest number of amicus
briefs that can plausibly be submitted in nongovernment cases, requires a
choice among administration goals and interests. At times there will be
fierce internal disagreements regarding which policies the Solicitor Gen-
eral ought give priority to in the Supreme Court.
The traditional procedural independence of the Solicitor General is
essential precisely because the Solicitor General is so often the focal point
of these interagency, intra-administration conflicts. When the Solicitor
General takes a position on the merits of an issue there will often, per-
haps ordinarily, be someone in the administration who disagrees with the
Solicitor General's conclusions. If an appeal of right were available to
the Attorney General, or to the White House, it might be the unusual
case indeed in which no administration official demanded that reconsid-
eration. Higher level officials must resist entertaining such appeals, not
because they are confident the Solicitor General is always right, but be-
cause they can be certain that someone else will almost always think the
Solicitor General is wrong. Some exceptions are doubtless possible, but
they must be handled in a way which will avoid precipitating an ava-
lanche of appeals, or undermining the confidence of the Solicitor General
and others that the Solicitor General's decisions will ordinarily be final.
The delicate balancing role which the Solicitor General's office so
often plays makes it essential to protect that office from the various ideo-
logical fevers that occasionally rage through an administration. The So-
licitor General's views, of course, must be reasonably compatible with
those of the administration if he or she is to be able to sleep at night. But
the Solicitor General cannot protect the Court, and the administration,
from errors of judgment induced by ideological passions if he or she is
among the impassioned. A Solicitor General who boasts of his enthusias-
tic personal support for the goals of an administration may well not un-
derstand that those goals invariably conflict, and that his enthusiasm
may be not for the policies of the administration as a whole, but for those
of a particular faction. The Solicitor General's staff must be chosen with
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similar considerations in mind. The existence during the Reagan years of
a "political" deputy, approved by and accountable to the White House,
has been criticized as tending to impair the office's willingness to meet its
obligations to the Court;254 it is no less serious an objection to this prac-
tice that the political deputy may have represented, not the diverse policy
concerns of the administration as a whole, but the priorities of a particu-
lar circle of White House advisers. Precisely because of the need to un-
derstand the differing perspectives from which the justices will view a
case, the Solicitor General needs on his or her staff lawyers with a variety
of views and preconceptions. In 1983, the National Review complained
about the number of "Carter holdovers swarm[ing] all over [the Solicitor
General's Office];" 2 5 but an office of lawyers who all agreed with Chief
Justice Rehnquist would be likely to write briefs with which only Chief
Justice Rehnquist could agree. "Holdovers" should be regarded, not as
the detritus of an ideologically corrupt ancien regime, but as a welcome
source of diversity and a guarantee of intellectual honesty. The next So-
licitor General, particularly under a Democratic administration, ought to
understand the value of retaining some of those much reviled Reaganites.
Independence is critical to the fumctioning of the Solicitor General's
office, but the Solicitor General must wield that independence with judi-
cious restraint. Living and working in the midst of an extraordinary
swirl of social, political and public controversies, any Solicitor General
with a modicum of intellectual curiosity would be tempted to join in the
fray, to assume that the priorities of the faction with which the Solicitor
General happened to agree represented the views of the administration or
the policies of the President, to see in the law a mandate for whatever
policies he or she chanced to favor. Even a Solicitor General who is able
to resist those temptations will, under the best of circumstances, be
caught in the middle of contentious colleagues from the White House,
the Justice Department and other agencies, between competing obliga-
tions to various administration camps, to Congress, and to the Supreme
Court, but in the middle is precisely the place where the Solicitor Gen-
eral ought to be.
254. McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 611.
255. L. CAPLAN, supra note 9, at 62-64, 135, 220; Office Polticized, supra note 10.
Note: After this Article went to the printer, a May 2, 1988 United States Supreme Court
decision discussed at length the role of the Solicitor General. See United States v. Providence
Journal Co., 56 U.S.L.W. 4366 (1988).
June 1988] 1271
1272 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1187
